Interim costs awards in arbitration proceedings are not often the precursors to winding up applications. However, it may happen that if such an award of costs is not paid, the possibility of winding up the non-paying party may arise. This possibility leads to the following question, "Is a bill of costs drafted pursuant to an arbitration award and taxed by the taxing master of the High Court a "debt" for purposes of section 345 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973?"

In recent years it appears to have become a common trend for distressed homeowners to publish voluntary surrender notices as a stratagem to stay execution proceedings instituted by creditors. We have also witnessed an increase in institutions approaching distressed homeowners following publication of a notice of sale in execution, purporting to be in the business of assisting distressed homeowners by guarding their homes from sales in execution by the sheriffs of the high courts.

One of the first cases involving the operation of section 153(1)(a)(ii) of the Companies Act 71  of 2008 is the matter of Copper Sunset Trading 220 (Pty) Ltd t/a Build It Lephalale (In Business Rescue) and Spar Group Limited (First Respondent) and Normandien Farms (Pty) Ltd (Second Respondent).  This matter was decided under case 365/2014 in the High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria) functioning as Limpopo Division, Polokwane.

On 2 September 2014 the Constitutional Court heard an appeal against a final order of sequestration granted by the High Court of South Africa (Western Cape High Court) on 14 August 2013 sequestrating the joint estate of Mr Ivor Charles Stratford, the former chairman of the Pinnacle Point Group, and his wife Mrs Sheila Margaret Stratford (the Stratfords). 

The advent of the new Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Act) brought with it a shift from a creditor-protectionist society towards a business rescue model that is debtor-protectionist. In consequence, there has been a swarm of applications taking advantage and exploiting this new scheme. This shift has unfortunately led to considerable abuse of the business rescue procedure.

An interesting judgment was delivered by the Honourable J Majiki on 19 of November 2013 in the Eastern Cape High Court, Port Elizabeth. The first and second applicants under case 3521/2012 were ABSA Bank Limited and Maria Ramos respectively.

Section 153 (1)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Act) is intended to afford a remedy to affected persons who support a business rescue plan that has been 

The section can be broken down into five key elements:

Consider the following commonly encountered scenario: A creditor had instituted litigation proceedings against Company X and obtained a default judgment against it. Pursuant to the judgment the creditor issued a writ of execution, but is now faced with the situation where an affected person has brought an application in terms of section 131(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Act) to place Company X under supervision and to commence business rescue proceedings. What is the effect on the creditor?

In this article we investigate whether, in South African law, a subordination agreement could constitute a "voidable disposition" as defined in section 26 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 (the Act). 
 
Section 26 of the Act provides that every disposition of property not made for value may be set aside by the court, if the disposition was made by an insolvent (whether an individual, company or close corporation) either: 
 

Although business rescue may be a good tool for the purpose of turning around financially distressed businesses, it also opens the door for abuse by unscrupulous debtors. 

A business rescue application may be brought at any time during liquidation proceedings, even after a final winding-up order has been granted, right up until the point where a final liquidation and distribution account is confirmed by the Master of the High Court.