Can a creditor cancel an agreement with a company in business rescue and what is the consequence of a business rescue practitioner suspending an agreement before cancellation?

The lawfulness of cancelling a contract during business rescue

Section 134 of Act 71 of 2008 is extremely important because it is there to protect the interests of both the company in business rescue and the creditors and other third parties related to the company.

The advent of the new Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Act) brought with it a shift from a creditor-protectionist society towards a business rescue model that is debtor-protectionist. In consequence, there has been a swarm of applications taking advantage and exploiting this new scheme. This shift has unfortunately led to considerable abuse of the business rescue procedure.

Judge Andre van Niekerk handed down an interesting judgment in the High Court of South Africa (North Gauteng Division) on 30 September 2013.  In my respectful opinion the judgment is insightful and is correct.  The facts are fairly simple.  Miles Plant Hire (Pty) Ltd (MPH) had a tax liability of R37 441 090.59 to the commissioner of the South African Revenue Services (SARS). SARS had levied a tax assessment in this amount on MPH, which included penalties and interest.

It is common practice to find directors of a company standing surety for the company in order to secure its debts. The consequence could be severe for the sureties, because if the company is unable to pay its debt, the creditor can take legal action against the directors or other third parties in their capacity as sureties, unless the company pays its debts and the sureties are released from liability.

Interim costs awards in arbitration proceedings are not often the precursors to winding up applications. However, it may happen that if such an award of costs is not paid, the possibility of winding up the non-paying party may arise. This possibility leads to the following question, "Is a bill of costs drafted pursuant to an arbitration award and taxed by the taxing master of the High Court a "debt" for purposes of section 345 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973?"

In recent years it appears to have become a common trend for distressed homeowners to publish voluntary surrender notices as a stratagem to stay execution proceedings instituted by creditors. We have also witnessed an increase in institutions approaching distressed homeowners following publication of a notice of sale in execution, purporting to be in the business of assisting distressed homeowners by guarding their homes from sales in execution by the sheriffs of the high courts.

One of the first cases involving the operation of section 153(1)(a)(ii) of the Companies Act 71  of 2008 is the matter of Copper Sunset Trading 220 (Pty) Ltd t/a Build It Lephalale (In Business Rescue) and Spar Group Limited (First Respondent) and Normandien Farms (Pty) Ltd (Second Respondent).  This matter was decided under case 365/2014 in the High Court of South Africa (Gauteng Division, Pretoria) functioning as Limpopo Division, Polokwane.

On 2 September 2014 the Constitutional Court heard an appeal against a final order of sequestration granted by the High Court of South Africa (Western Cape High Court) on 14 August 2013 sequestrating the joint estate of Mr Ivor Charles Stratford, the former chairman of the Pinnacle Point Group, and his wife Mrs Sheila Margaret Stratford (the Stratfords). 

Consider the following commonly encountered scenario: A creditor had instituted litigation proceedings against Company X and obtained a default judgment against it. Pursuant to the judgment the creditor issued a writ of execution, but is now faced with the situation where an affected person has brought an application in terms of section 131(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Act) to place Company X under supervision and to commence business rescue proceedings. What is the effect on the creditor?