Human resources practitioners are often called upon to advise and lead employee consultation in a business restructure. Sometimes, a legal review of the statutory consultation notice issued under section 189(3) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 (the LRA) is also undertaken.
It has become a common phenomenon that applications are brought to put into business rescue, companies which are already in liquidation – sometimes long after the liquidation commenced.
This raises some interesting questions about whether employees and trade unions remain affected persons for the purposes of such a business rescue application, given that in terms of section 38 of the Insolvency Act (24 of 1936), all employment contracts are deemed to be cancelled within 45 days after the appointment of a final liquidator.
Section 131(6)
Human resources practitioners are often called upon to advise and lead employee consultation in a business restructure. Sometimes, a legal review of the statutory consultation notice issued under section 189(3) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 (the LRA) is also undertaken.
It’s an open secret that the commendable goals envisaged by the legislature with the introduction of the business rescue proceedings in Chapter 6 of our Companies Act are being hampered as a result of poorly drafted statutory provisions that govern the business rescue process. Section 141(2)(a)(ii) is however not one of these vague provisions.
What can the UK and South Africa learn from each other by comparing the business rescue regime with administration?
South Africa’s relatively recent business rescue regime (introduced in 2011) has exploded into a popular process for “affected persons” facing a company in financial distress. It shares some aspects with the administration procedure in England and Wales (UK). Lessons can be drawn from both the similarities and the differences between the two procedures that may benefit restructuring and insolvency practitioners both in the UK and South Africa.
Dead Horses
When is a dead horse really a dead horse? Given that ‘insolvency’ opens the door to various procedures for creditors and others, it should (in theory) be fairly easy to define. In practice, however, it is not.
Since the inception of business rescue, misconduct by business rescue practitioners (BRPs) has been one of the biggest causes of complaint (and headaches) by creditors. More and more disgruntled creditors and other affected persons are pursuing the removal of rogue BRPs of companies in business rescue.
In terms of section 139 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, a BRP may only be removed from office in terms of section 130, or as provided for in section 139. Furthermore, only the court is authorised to remove a BRP from office, both in terms of sections 130 and 139.
Section 44 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 governs the instances when a company may provide financial assistance for the purchase of the company's securities. (It is important to note that section 44(1) carves out the application of the entire section 44 for financial assistance given in the ordinary course of business by a company whose primary business is lending money.)
Section 133 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 provides for a general moratorium on legal proceedings against a company in business rescue.
I wrote an article published in the June issue of Without Prejudice in which this question was considered. I criticised the then binding judgment of Chetty t/a Nationwide Electrical v Hart NO and Another (12559/2012) [20141 ZAKZDHC 9 (25 March 2014), as it was held in that case that arbitration proceedings do not constitute legal proceedings for purposes of section 133 of the Act.
Judge Megarry in Re Rolls Razor Limited1, aptly describes the necessity of insolvency enquiries: