The validity of an assignment of receivables cross-border depends on the law that applies to the assignment.
What might amount to a valid assignment in one jurisdiction, does not mean, that it is valid in another and where there are competing claims to the receivables and competing jurisdictions, the question of which law applies and therefore whether there has been a valid assignment significantly affects the ability of the assignee to rely on the assignment.
In Germany, securitization SPVs, factoring companies and asset based lenders take security over the leased assets owned by the leasing company by way of a security transfer of title. However, in all cases of a leasing company’s insolvency where the leasing company has still possession of the assets, the owner of the security in the leased assets was in the past not seen as being entitled to realise the value of the assets itself.
Under German law, there are strict legal obligations for the managing directors of an insolvent company to file for insolvency. Failure to comply exposes a managing director to civil and criminal liability. It is therefore important for managing directors to know how to test whether their company is insolvent. One of the legal reasons for insolvency is illiquidity and the second senate of the German Federal Civil Court (“BGH”) has, in a decision dated 19 December 2017 (II ZR 88/16), clarified a question regarding the illiquidity test.
A recent ruling of the German Federal Civil Court (Bundesgerichtshof (“BGH”)) is a reminder of the risks which shareholders of a German company can face in an insolvency of their German subsidiary.
German insolvency laws are very strict. The management of an insolvent company is under strict obligations to file for insolvency, and failure to comply with such obligation may result in civil and criminal liability. Other stakeholders, like financing banks or suppliers, who are dealing with a distressed company, require documentation that their contract partner can be restructured, in order to avoid potential liability and claw back risk in case of a future insolvency.
In the context of German restructuring, bridge loans (Überbrückungskredite) are loans that are granted to financially distressed companies until a restructuring plan is formulated in order to avoid the company’s insolvency. In most cases, such loans are granted for a limited timeframe. After the restructuring plan has been finalized, renegotiations are usually required, in particular between the company, the lender and the company’s other creditors.
As part of an intended comprehensive amendment of German insolvency law, the German Federal Ministry of Justice has prepared a draft of a new law to facilitate the reorganization of enterprises (“Reorganization Facilitation Act”). The new law will curtail the rights of shareholders of insolvent companies and allow capital measures and other corporate measures to be taken in the insolvency of a company without the participation of the shareholders. The new regulation is of interest to investors because it will significantly simplify the purchase of the shares of an insolvent company.
A main focus of the anticipated reform of the law governing limited liability companies by the draft Act on the Modernization of the Law on Limited Liability Companies and the Prevention of Abuse (generally referred to as the “MoMiG” or “Modernization Act”) is the new set of rules relating to shareholder debt financings.
In a judgment of November 29, 2007 that is of particular interest to financial institutions involved in asset-based lending, the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) allayed concerns that a global assignment (Globalzession)—the assignment of all existing and future trade receivables to a lender to secure loans—would not survive the insolvency of the respective originator.[1] This decision was eagerly awaited because various judgments of German Higher Regional Courts (Oberlandesgerichte) had raised concerns lately that the security interest over receivables created in the last th
Chapter 11 focuses on preserving reorganization or going concern value over liquidation value. As a corollary, Chapter 11 assumes that the most efficacious way to achieve that result is to retain management and enable multiple outcomes either through a plan of reorganization, a series of going concern sales and even a liquidating plan. Chapter 11 enables a wide range of proposals to be put into a reorganization plan, including having the company and its management survive the process.