In 1991, a decision of the Delaware Chancery Court helped popularize the term "zone of insolvency.”[1] In the intervening 16 years, numerous courts and commentators have cited this decision as standing for the proposition that the directors of a Delaware corporation that is either insolvent or in the zone of insolvency owe fiduciary duties to the creditors, as well as to the shareholders, of the corporation.
In order to get the information necessary to seize a debtor's assets or garnish his income, Rule 60.18 of the Rules of Court permit a creditor to require a debtor to attend an examination under oath before a court reporter and be questioned in relation to:
(a) the reason for non-payment or non-performance of the judgment;
(b) the debtor's income and property;
(c) the debts owed to and by the debtor;
(d) the disposal the debtor has made of any property either before or after the making of the order;
A fundamental premise of chapter 11 is that a debtor’s prebankruptcy management is presumed to provide the most capable and dedicated leadership for the company and should be allowed to continue operating the company’s business and managing its assets in bankruptcy while devising a viable business plan or other workable exit strategy. The chapter 11 “debtor-in-possession” (“DIP ”) is a concept rooted strongly in modern U.S. bankruptcy jurisprudence. Still, the presumption can be overcome.
In the summer of 2007, we reported on Gredd v. Bear, Stearns Securities Corp. (In re Manhattan Investment Fund, Ltd.),1 decided by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has held that a severance payment made to an executive who worked for both Enron Corp. (“Enron”) and various affiliates of Enron prior to Enron’s filing for bankruptcy was a preferential transfer that could be avoided by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”).1 In reaching this conclusion, the Bankruptcy Court rejected the argument that the severance payment was an “ordinary course” transaction that was protected from avoidance.
Sometimes the interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code leads to unexpected results. In a recent case, the US Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit (BAP) has ruled that section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code requires the subordination of certain claims against a debtor to all equity interests in the debtor, even though such subordination may mean that the holders of the claims will receive nothing on the claims.
The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (“WARN”) requires an employer to give 60 days’ advance written notice prior to a plant closing or mass layoff. Frequently, as a company encounters financial distress—a situation that often leads to a plant closing or mass layoff— creditors exercise greater control over the entity in an attempt to recover debts owed to them. When the faltering company fails to provide the requisite WARN notice, terminated employees often assert that WARN liability should attach to such creditors. In Coppola v. Bear, Stearns & Co.
In Kendrick v. Deutsche National Trust Company (In re Saint Clair), 380 B.R. 478 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. Jan. 16, 2008), the Chapter 7 Trustee appealed the decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky to the Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”). The issue on appeal was whether summary judgment was warranted against the Appellee-Mortgagor (“Mortgagor”) on the Appellant- Trustee’s (“Trustee”) complaint seeking to avoid a mortgage on the Debtors’ real property.
On April 9, 2008, the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued its opinion in Miller v. McDonald, et al., 2008 WL 1002035 (Bkrtcy.D.Del.), in which it held that the general counsel of a public company had a duty to implement a system that would provide reasonable monitoring to prevent corporate wrongdoing. The court found that the general counsel’s duty arose from two sources. First, Delaware law imposes a duty on directors and senior officers to implement a system that would provide reasonable monitoring of corporate activity.
Directors and officers of troubled companies are already keenly cognizant of their potential liability for any breaches of fiduciary duty, negligence and fraud.