The latest in a line of fraudulent transfer decisions in the Madoff case has added to the case-law regarding what level of knowledge is needed to plead actual fraud in securities Ponzi scheme cases.

In a March 29, 2016 decision,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the "Court of Appeals") held that creditors are preempted from asserting state law constructive fraudulent conveyance claims by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbors" that, among other things, exempt transfers made in connection with a contract for the purchase, sale or loan of a security (here, in the context of a leveraged buyout ("LBO")), from being clawed back into the bankruptcy estate for distribution to creditors.

Recently, lawyers for 50 Cent fought against the appointment of a bankruptcy examiner to investigate Instagram photos the rapper posted of himself lying next to piles of hundred dollar bills. In one picture, the bills spelled out the word “BROKE.” The humor of the photos was lost on the Office of the U.S. Trustee, who viewed the postings as disrespectful of the bankruptcy process and possible evidence that 50 Cent committed bankruptcy fraud by concealing assets from his creditors.

Second Circuit holds that Bankruptcy Code preempts creditors’ state law constructive fraud claims.

On January 1, 2016, Kentucky joined a growing movement among states across the country to revise fraudulent transfer statutes. Kentucky accomplished this by repealing its statutes on fraudulent transfers and preferential transfers (KRS 378.010 et seq.), and replacing them with the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (“UVTA”) (KRS 378A.005 et seq.). The UVTA was designed to replace the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”) that was previously adopted by 43 other states (which did not include Kentucky).

Your business receives payment for goods or services that your business provided to a customer (“XYZ Inc.”). Your business is paid from the customer’s corporate account. You know that the payment came from XYZ Inc.’s corporate account because the check or credit card used for payment is in the name of XYZ Inc. However, three years later, you receive a letter from the “trustee” of XYZ Inc., now a debtor in bankruptcy, demanding payment of the money your business received for having provided goods or services to XYZ Inc.

(6th Cir. Mar. 28, 2016)

The Sixth Circuit affirms the order granting summary judgment to the creditor, finding a debt nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). Summary judgment was appropriate because the debtor was collaterally estopped from defending against the fraud claim. The creditor had obtained a default judgment against the debtor, post-petition, in another court as a sanction. The court holds that the entry of the default judgment was not a violation of the automatic stay. Opinion below.

Judge: Boggs

Attorney for Debtor: Jonathan Rudman Bunn

A corporation’s asset sale “was structured [by its insiders] so as to fraudulently transfer assets in order to avoid paying [a major creditor] what it was owed,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on March 22, 2016. Continental Casualty Co. v. Symons, 2016 WL 1118566, at *6 (7th Cir., March 22, 2016).

On March 1, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court heard argument on the seemingly simple question of what “actual fraud” means.  The Court’s decision will have a significant impact on the reach of the exception to discharge under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.

The Seventh Circuit (which covers Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin) appears to have added a new and potentially conflicting standard in analyzing  a third-party transferee’s “good faith” defense to a fraudulent transfer claim.  The good faith defense protects a third-party transferee from having to return the value it received from a debtor as a part of a fraudulent transaction so long as that third-party transferee entered into the transaction with the debtor in good faith.