In the latest decision to emanate from the Madoff bankruptcy, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the appeal of a protective order that relieved Irving Picard—the court-appointed trustee—from answering discovery requests regarding his compensation arrangement with his law firm.

As we have discussed in prior blog posts, The Battle of the Student Loan Discharge, The Eternal Pursuit to Collect: Due Process Rights and Actions to Collect on a Debtor’s Defaulted Student Loans

Learning the interplay between state rules of judicial procedure and federal bankruptcy law can be a daunting undertaking, but the pitfalls of failing to do so can be severe. A recent example of the importance of being mindful of these issues is Hewett v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. as Trustee, No. 2D15–1074, 2016 WL 3065014 (Fla. 2d DCA June 1, 2016) where the filing of a bankruptcy petition ultimately cost a foreclosure defendant his right to appeal a final judgment of foreclosure.

The Second DCA summarized the procedural posture of the case as follows:

INTRODUCTION

On June 2, 2010, the Third Circuit overruled longstanding precedent interpreting the definition of a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code. In JELD-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s Inc.), No. 09-1563, slip op., (3d Cir. June 2, 2010) an en banc panel rejected the state law accrual theory of claims recognition established in Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (Matter of M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), in favor of the more widely followed conduct test theory.

A recent defeat by a student-loan creditor could turn out to be a victory for the industry overall.

On March 23, 2010, the United States Supreme Court decided an important case concerning a student-loan creditor’s motion to void a bankruptcy court’s judgment.1 The creditor brought this motion after initiating collection efforts and in response to the debtor’s request to cease and desist those efforts.

JELD-WEN, Inc v Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s Inc), (3d Cir No 09-1563, June 2, 2010)

CASE SNAPSHOT

A Cuyahoga County, Ohio trial court did not abuse its discretion when it appointed a receiver for a “defunct” foreign corporation that the trial court found “persists for the purpose of winding up its affairs in Ohio.”In re: All Cases against Sager Corporation (2010), 188 Ohio App 3d 796, appeal accepted for review (2011), 127 Ohio St. 3d 1503. The Court of Appeals found it undisputed that corporate assets existed after the foreign corporation had been dissolved, “and that these assets may afford insurance coverage to Ohioans injured by exposure to Sager’s products”.

On April 25, 2011, the Rhode Island Superior Court (Silverstein, J.) ruled in favor of the constitutionality of the Voluntary Restructuring of Solvent Insurers Act (the “Restructuring Act”), a state statute enacted in 2002 that allows Rhode Island domestic commercial insurers and reinsurers (including those that redomesticate to Rhode Island) to enter into a commutation plan for their run-off business.

Although it has been described as an “extraordinary remedy,” the ability of a bankruptcy court to order the substantive consolidation of related debtor-entities in bankruptcy (if circumstances so dictate) is relatively uncontroversial, as an appropriate exercise of a bankruptcy court’s broad (albeit nonstatutory) equitable powers. By contrast, considerable controversy surrounds the far less common practice of ordering consolidation of a debtor in bankruptcy with a nondebtor.