It is common knowledge that the Bankruptcy Code provides a debtor with a “fresh start” by allowing it to discharge prepetition claims. Similarly, section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a trustee or debtor in possession to sell property of the estate “free and clear” of prior claims. These two concepts, while relatively straightforward, raise a fundamental question — when does a creditor hold a “claim” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code?
If you are one of the lucky product manufacturers who weathered the recent economic downturn well and are looking to buy assets from those who did not survive…beware!
It has long been understood by buyers of assets of distressed companies that once a sale is authorized pursuant to Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, the buyer is absolved of any liabilities which may have encumbered the assets of the previous owner, including causes of actions against them. However, a recent decision from the influential United States District Court for the Southern District of New York saddles buyers with the burden of unknown potential future claims.
USDC S.D. California, February 10, 2012
On November 22, 2011, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued a per curiam opinion that piqued the interest of bankruptcy practitioners nationwide and sent secured creditors scrambling to ensure that their rights to a deficiency claim had been properly preserved in pending bankruptcy cases. The Eleventh Circuit held that the IRS had waived its right to an unsecured deficiency by filing a proof of claim that evidenced a secured claim but failed to note that a portion of the claim may be unsecured.
For some years, companies in the United Kingdom have utilized a statutory process called solvent schemes of arrangement. These schemes amount to what in the United States is called a “cram down” voluntary reorganization of financially distressed, but solvent, debtors. They impose upon creditors reductions in the amount owed to them outside the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Rhode Island adopted a similar statutory scheme, which became effective in 2004.
As we’ve previously covered in prior blog posts, Being In Love Means Never Being Able To Get Your Student Loans Discharged, Or Why Stedman Graham Should Have To Pay His Student Loans and
On September 8, 2015, a federal district court invalidated a portion of the Georgia post-judgment garnishment statute in Strickland v. Alexander, No. 1:12-CV-02735-MHS (N.D. Ga.). Senior Judge Marvin Shoob found that the statute was constitutionally deficient on due process grounds, insofar as it fails to require:
In In re Arch Wireless,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a creditor who asserted claims against the debtor in various correspondence between the parties was a “known” claimant of the debtor’s estate entitled to direct notice of the bar date by which it must file a proof of claim. The Court of Appeals concluded that publication notice was insufficient to inform the creditor of the bar date or of the terms of the confirmed plan, even though the creditor was generally aware of the debtor’s bankruptcy filing.
A known creditor, which was aware of a debtor’s pending bankruptcy but did not receive legally required notice of the debtor’s chapter 11 case, was not barred from bringing a state action following bankruptcy discharge.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that actual knowledge of the pending chapter 11 case did not satisfy due process requirements; therefore, the known creditor’s subsequent claim was not barred by the debtor’s discharge injunction. Arch Wireless, Inc. v. Nationwide Paging, Inc. (In re Arch Wireless, Inc.), 534 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2008).