On April 16, General Growth Properties, Inc. and certain of its affiliates (“GGP”) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. GGP operates a national network of approximately 200 shopping centers. To the surprise of many, most of GGP’s property-specific SPE subsidiaries (“SPE Debtors”) also filed for bankruptcy.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey recently found that a debtor’s transfer of property owned by a corporation in which the debtor allegedly held a 50% interest did not automatically constitute a transfer of assets of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate. After the debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, the Chapter 7 trustee filed an adversary complaint alleging that the debtor purposefully had executed a post-petition mortgage lien on certain real property owned by a corporation of which the debtor was a 50% owner.
On January 8, Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL), Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT), Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) and Representative John Conyers (D-MI) announced an agreement with Citigroup on legislation that would allow homeowners in bankruptcy to alter the terms of their mortgages. Citigroup has agreed to support the "Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act," introduced by Senator Durbin on January 6, along with a companion bill that was introduced on the same day in the House of Representatives by Representative Conyers.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the Court) recently granted a motion to dismiss a mezzanine borrower’s chapter 11 bankruptcy petition at the outset of the debtor’s case.1 In In re JER/Jameson Mezz Borrower II, LLC, The Court found that the debtor’s petition had been filed in bad faith because, among other things, a junior mezzanine lender had directed the debtor to file the petition with the intent of hindering a senior mezzanine lender’s foreclosure efforts and without any valid reorganization purpose.
Plaintiff, the trustee of the Chapter 7 estate of Security Asset Capital Corporation (SACC), a corporate debtor, brought an action against the debtor’s officers and directors, alleging that they breached their fiduciary duties by failing to commence Chapter 7 liquidation once SACC became insolvent.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the Court), has held that section 553(a) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits a swap counterparty from setting off amounts owed to the debtor against amounts owed by the debtor to affiliates of the counterparty, notwithstanding the safe harbor provision in section 561 of the Bankruptcy Code and language in the ISDA Master Agreement permitting the swap counterparty to effect “triangular” setoffs. In re Lehman Brothers Inc., Case No. 08-01420 (JMP)(SIPA) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. October 4, 2011).
In re Zais Investment Grade Ltd. VII1 is the latest in a recent line of bankruptcy cases challenging bedrock assumptions regarding securitization special purpose entities (SPEs) and bankruptcy considerations in securitization transactions.2 Zais establishes precedent allowing a senior noteholder of a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) to place the CDO issuer in an involuntary chapter 11 bankruptcy in order to advance an asset management plan that would otherwise require supermajority approval of all noteholders (including all junior classes) under the related indenture.
The scenario has become all too familiar in recent years: a borrower defaults on a loan and, when the lender pursues the loan collateral through foreclosure or other proceedings, the borrower files for bankruptcy protection. More often than not, when the lender appears in bankruptcy court to pursue its interest in the collateral, the borrower counterattacks with a host of state law lender liability claims.
In In re Zair, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49032 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2016), the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York became the latest to take sides on the emerging issue of “forced vesting” through a chapter 13 plan. After analyzing Bankruptcy Code §§ 1322(b)(9) and 1325(a)(5), the court concluded that a chapter 13 debtor could not, through a chapter 13 plan, force a mortgagee to take title to the mortgage collateral.
Background
In a corporate system based in part on the separation of ownership and control, the relationship between principals and agents is riddled with agency problems: Among them are potential conflicts of interest where agents may abuse their fiduciary position for their own benefit as opposed to the benefit of the principals to whom they are obligated. Delineating the agents' fiduciary duties is thus a central focus of corporate law, and the dereliction of those duties often comes under scrutiny in the bankruptcy context.