The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the Court), has held that section 553(a) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits a swap counterparty from setting off amounts owed to the debtor against amounts owed by the debtor to affiliates of the counterparty, notwithstanding the safe harbor provision in section 561 of the Bankruptcy Code and language in the ISDA Master Agreement permitting the swap counterparty to effect “triangular” setoffs. In re Lehman Brothers Inc., Case No. 08-01420 (JMP)(SIPA) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. October 4, 2011).
In re Zais Investment Grade Ltd. VII1 is the latest in a recent line of bankruptcy cases challenging bedrock assumptions regarding securitization special purpose entities (SPEs) and bankruptcy considerations in securitization transactions.2 Zais establishes precedent allowing a senior noteholder of a collateralized debt obligation (CDO) to place the CDO issuer in an involuntary chapter 11 bankruptcy in order to advance an asset management plan that would otherwise require supermajority approval of all noteholders (including all junior classes) under the related indenture.
The scenario has become all too familiar in recent years: a borrower defaults on a loan and, when the lender pursues the loan collateral through foreclosure or other proceedings, the borrower files for bankruptcy protection. More often than not, when the lender appears in bankruptcy court to pursue its interest in the collateral, the borrower counterattacks with a host of state law lender liability claims.
In In re Zair, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49032 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2016), the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York became the latest to take sides on the emerging issue of “forced vesting” through a chapter 13 plan. After analyzing Bankruptcy Code §§ 1322(b)(9) and 1325(a)(5), the court concluded that a chapter 13 debtor could not, through a chapter 13 plan, force a mortgagee to take title to the mortgage collateral.
Background
In a corporate system based in part on the separation of ownership and control, the relationship between principals and agents is riddled with agency problems: Among them are potential conflicts of interest where agents may abuse their fiduciary position for their own benefit as opposed to the benefit of the principals to whom they are obligated. Delineating the agents' fiduciary duties is thus a central focus of corporate law, and the dereliction of those duties often comes under scrutiny in the bankruptcy context.
The failure of debtors to accurately list and value assets in their bankruptcy schedules is certainly not a new phenomenon. Recently, however, we are witnessing an increase in bankruptcy cases where debtors are using clever and deliberate means to omit assets or disguise the true value of their assets in an attempt to thwart recovery by creditors. While the U.S. trustee's or a creditor's remedy for such bad acts is to seek a denial of the debtor's discharge under 11 U.S.C.
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) filed an objection on June 14, 2012, in the Delaware bankruptcy court proceedings of RG Steel ("Debtor"), challenging a recent sale by RG Steel's parent entity ("Parent") of a 25-percent ownership stake in the Debtor. If the sale is respected, Parent would fall outside of the Debtor's "controlled group" under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), with the result that Parent may cease to have joint liability for the Debtor's unfunded pension obligations.
On Aug. 4, 2015, in City of Concord, New Hampshire v. Northern New England Telephone Operations LLC (In re Northern New England Telephone Operations LLC), No. 14-3381 (2nd Cir. Aug. 4, 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed the circumstances under which a creditor's lien on the property of a debtor may be extinguished through a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in In re Philadelphia Newspapers LLC,1 has ruled that secured creditors do not have a right, as a matter of law, to credit bid their claims when their collateral is sold under a plan of reorganization. The Third Circuit held that secured creditors may be barred from credit bidding where a debtor's reorganization plan provides secured creditors with the "indubitable equivalent" of their secured interest in the assets. The court's ruling follows a similar ruling last year by the U.S.
On November 5, 2015, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California issued a “Memorandum re Plan Confirmation” in In re Bowie, Case No. 15-10144 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Nov.