The credit crunch has put pressure on a wide range of structures and, as a result, lenders, borrowers and other counterparties are looking more closely at the impact of possible insolvency proceedings. As Jersey companies have often been used in cross-border finance transactions, it is important to be aware of the differences between Jersey and English insolvency procedures for companies.
What are the main Jersey insolvency procedures for a Jersey company?
These are:-
The Delaware bankruptcy court recently decided that a debtor could not assign a trademark license absent the consent of the licensor. The court concluded that federal trademark law and the terms of the license precluded assignment without consent. Because the debtor could not assign the license under any circumstances (consent was not forthcoming), the court held that cause existed to annul the automatic stay to permit the licensor to “move on with its trademark and its business.”
The secured lender industry experienced a collective sigh of relief on May 29 after the Supreme Court ruled in RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, et al. v. Amalgamated Bank that credit bidding remains a viable option to protect collateral in a cramdown bankruptcy plan. Expressly inscribed in Sections 363(k) and 1129(b)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, credit bidding has long been understood as a fairly uncontroversial right; until recently.
In an earlier blog piece we reported on the Third Circuit’s 2015 decision in In re Jevic Holding Corp. where the Court approved a settlement, implemented through a structured dismissal, which allowed junior creditors to receive a distribution prior to senior creditors being paid in full.
In general, a company has two bankruptcy alternatives: liquidation under Chapter 7 and reorganization under Chapter 11.
Under Chapter 7, upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, a trustee is appointed to gather and sell all of the debtor’s assets as quickly as possible. Once the trustee liquidates all of the assets, it must pay creditors in accordance with the priority scheme mandated by the Bankruptcy Code:
On April 15, 2016, the IRS released a generic legal advice memorandum (GLAM 2016-001) (the “April GLAM”) addressing the impact of so-called “bad boy” guarantees (also known as nonrecourse carve-out guarantees) on the characterization of underlying partnership debt as recourse vs. nonrecourse under Section 752 of the Internal Revenue Code.
In today’s economy, we continue to see bankruptcies occurring in the construction sector. An owner, contractor, or subcontractor in financial distress can easily delay a project — or worse, jeopardize the project in its entirety. Contractors need to understand their rights in order to minimize their exposure in bankruptcy-related situations.
Protecting Contractors — Frequently Asked Questions
A draft of the U.S. Treasury’s proposed debt restructuring legislation began circulating earlier today. The draft legislation would give Puerto Rico, as well as other U.S. territories, and their municipalities access to U.S. bankruptcy court under a new chapter of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (so-called “Super Chapter 9”) as well as making Puerto Rico’s instrumentalities (but not Puerto Rico itself) potentially eligible to file for bankruptcy under existing Chapter 9.
In a decision that may have implications for holders of community development district bonds and other similar “dirt bonds,” a Florida bankruptcy court has ruled that holders of community development district bonds do not always have plan voting rights when the underlying developer — as opposed to the development district itself — is the bankruptcy debtor.
Lending credence to the old adage “if it’s too good to be true, then it probably is,” the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that a secured lender was on inquiry notice of possible fraud by its borrower in impermissibly pledging customers’ assets to secure loans. And the penalty was steep—the Court determined the pledge to be a fraudulent transfer to the lender and the lender’s failure to act upon inquiry notice destroyed the lender’s good faith defense. As a result, the lender’s $300 million secured claim was reduced to a near-worthless general unsecured claim.