Editors’ Note: The Supreme Court’s Jevic ruling last spring remains a treasure trove of bankruptcy theory, suitable for the novice bankruptcy student and highly instructional for those of us who have practiced in chapter 11 for years. We at The Bankruptcy Cave like it so much that we will be offering a few more posts in upcoming weeks on the lower courts’ interpretation of Jevic since the spring, the continued efforts in Delaware to sidestep Jevic, and other important learning from the case.

There has been a relatively recent uptick in plaintiffs’ counsel filing putative class actions in multiple state and federal courts for alleged violations of a debtor’s bankruptcy discharge injunction based upon the debtor’s receipt of post-discharge mortgage-related communications. These claims assert putative class action challenges to post-discharge communications alleged to be attempts at personal collection of the discharged mortgage debt.

On February 27, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit joined a minority approach followed by District of Columbia Circuit: failing to turn over property after demand is not a violation of the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362. WD Equipment v. Cowen (In re Cowen), No. 15-1413, — F.3d —-, 2017 WL 745596 (10th Cir. Feb. 27, 2017), opinion here.

One of the most dramatic tools a lender can use in the collection of a loan is the involuntary bankruptcy case.  It is dramatic because of the implications for both the debtor and the lender who files the case.

While significant energy here at the Bankruptcy Cave is devoted to substantive bankruptcy matters, not all aspects of a general insolvency practice are always fun and litigation. Oftentimes insolvency lawyers add the most value by helping clients avoid a bankruptcy filing, or by successfully resolving a case through a consensual transactional restructuring.

On January 17, 2014, Chief Judge Kevin Gross of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued a decision  limiting the right of a holder of a secured claim to credit bid at a bankruptcy sale. In re Fisker Auto. Holdings, Inc.,  Case No. 13-13087-KG, 2014 WL 210593 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 17, 2014). Fisker raises significant issues for lenders who  are interested in selling their secured debt and for parties who buy secured debt with the goal of using the debt to  acquire the borrower’s assets through a credit bid.

Editor’s Note: This is a new one for us at The Bankruptcy Cave. We are starting a series of primers, covering a narrow range of law but with more depth than just “here’s a recent case.” And also, we have our first edition of “The Bankruptcy Cave Embedded Briefs” – top quality briefs on a certain issue, feel free to download to your own form files or come back and grab ’em when you need ’em. Let us know what you think – we are always trying to improve things around here for our readers.

One of the ironic issues for failing banks has been the fact that banks that they have had to continue to deal with their borrowers and depositors in the ordinary course of business even though they are already in the queue for resolution by the FDIC. So for example, loans continue to get renewed and documents executed. What happens if you renew a loan shortly before the bank fails, do you have some sort of defense to enforcement of the loan when the successor bank or the FDIC makes demand on you?

As the Supreme Court recently reminded us in Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, not all orders in bankruptcy cases are immediately appealable as a matter of right. Only those orders deemed sufficiently “final” may be appealed without leave under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).

The absolute priority rule of Section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code is a fundamental creditor protection in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. In general terms, the rule provides that if a class of unsecured creditors rejects a debtor’s reorganization plan and is not paid in full, junior creditors and equity interestholders may not receive or retain any property under the plan. The rule thus implements the general state-law principle that creditors are entitled to payment before shareholders, unless creditors agree to a different result.