Lawmakers’ efforts to overhaul the nation’s bankruptcy laws two years ago as part of the sweeping reforms implemented by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA ”) failed to resolve a number of important business bankruptcy issues that have been and continue to be the subject of protracted debate among the bankruptcy and appellate courts.

A debtor’s exclusive right to formulate and solicit acceptances for a plan of reorganization during the initial stages of a chapter 11 case is one of the most important benefits conferred under the Bankruptcy Code as a means of facilitating the successful restructuring of an ailing enterprise. By giving a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession time to devise a solution to balance sheet and operational problems without being burdened by the competing agendas of other stakeholders in the bankruptcy case, exclusivity levels the playing field, at least temporarily.

Section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code provides, subject to certain exceptions, that the Bankruptcy Code “does not affect any right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt owing by such creditor to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against a claim of such creditor against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case.” Debts are considered “mutual” when they are due to and from the same persons or entities in the same capacity.

Before soliciting votes on its bankruptcy plan, a chapter 11 debtor that has filed for bankruptcy typically must obtain court approval of its disclosure statement. As part of the disclosure-statement approval process, interested parties are afforded the opportunity to object. For example, a party may object on the grounds that the disclosure statement lacks sufficient information about the debtor. Sometimes, however, a party objects to the disclosure statement because the chapter 11 plan described by the statement cannot be confirmed.

A significant consideration in a prospective chapter 11 debtor's strategic prebankruptcy planning is the most favorable venue for the bankruptcy filing.

In the July/August 2010 edition of the Business Restructuring Review, we reported on an important ruling handed down by bankruptcy judge James M. Peck in the Lehman Brothers chapter 11 cases addressing the interaction between the Bankruptcy Code’s general setoff rules (set forth in section 553) and the Code’s safe harbors for financial contracts (found principally in sections 555, 556, and 559 through 562). In In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., 433 B.R. 101 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

April 17, 2009, will mark the three-and-one-half-year anniversary of the effective date of chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, which was enacted as part of the comprehensive bankruptcy reforms implemented under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005.

The aggregate value of private-equity acquisitions worldwide in 2006 exceeded $660 billion. If this number seems mind-boggling, consider that this record-breaking volume of transactions appears well on the way to being eclipsed in 2007. Even with corporate financing for leveraged buyouts harder to come by as a consequence of the sub-prime mortgage fallout, there is, by some estimates, $300 billion sitting globally in private-equity funds. Already on tap or completed in 2007: a $32 billion takeover of energy company TXU Corp.

Entities doing business with a customer that files for bankruptcy protection generally have the right to refuse to continue providing goods or services to the chapter 11 debtor, unless such goods or services are covered by a continuing contract, in which case any forfeiture of the debtor’s rights under the agreement is generally prohibited to afford the debtor a reasonable opportunity to decide what to do with the contract.

Recent Developments in Bankruptcy and Restructuring
Volume 13 l No. 3 l May–June 2014 JONES DAY
Business
Restructuring
Review
Eighth Circuit Expands Subsequent New Value
Preference Defense in Cases Involving Three-Party
Relationships
Charles M Oellermann and Mark G. Douglas
A bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor-in-possession has the power under section
547 of the Bankruptcy Code to avoid a transfer made immediately prior to
bankruptcy if the transfer unfairly prefers one or more creditors over the rest of