The "common interest" doctrine allows attorneys representing different clients with aligned legal interests to share information and documents without waiving the work-product doctrine or attorney-client privilege. Issues involving the common-interest doctrine often arise during the course of a business restructuring, because restructurings tend to involve various constituencies, including the company, the official committee of unsecured creditors, secured debt holders, other creditors, and equity holders whose legal interests may be aligned at any one time.
The failed bid of liquidators for two hedge funds affiliated with defunct investment firm Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., to obtain recognition of the funds’ Cayman Islands winding-up proceedings under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code was featured prominently in business headlines during the late summer and fall of 2007.
The strategic importance of classifying claims and interests under a chapter 11 plan is sometimes an invitation for creative machinations designed to muster adequate support for confirmation of the plan. Although the Bankruptcy Code unequivocally states that only “substantially similar” claims or interests can be classified together, it neither defines “substantial similarity” nor requires that all claims or interests fitting the description be classified together.
Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides a mechanism designed to preserve the creditor/shareholder risk allocation paradigm by categorically subordinating most types of claims asserted against a debtor by equity holders in respect of their equity holdings. However, courts do not always agree on the scope of this provision in undertaking to implement its underlying policy objectives. A New York bankruptcy court recently addressed this issue in In re Lehman Brothers Inc., 2014 BL 21201 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2014).
The recentThomas Cook refinancing and Cortefiel scheme of arrangement offer contrasting examples to investors of the risks and rewards of adopting a hold-out position in complex multijurisdictional restructurings.
As the seventh anniversary of the enactment of chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code draws near, the volume of chapter 15 cases commenced in U.S. bankruptcy courts on behalf of foreign debtors has increased rapidly. During that period, there has also (understandably) been a marked uptick in litigation concerning various aspects of the comparatively new legislative regime governing cross-border bankruptcy cases patterned on the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency. One such issue was the subject of a ruling recently handed down by a Texas district court. In In re Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V., 470 B.R.
Two recent decisions from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the "Bankruptcy Court") have further contributed to the rapidly expanding volume of chapter 15 jurisprudence. In In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., 2011 WL 1998374 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2011), and In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., 2011 WL 1998376 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2011), bankruptcy judge Burton R. Lifland rendered two decisions involving offshore "feeder funds" that invested in the massive Ponzi scheme associated with Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC ("BLMIS").
A debtor's decision to assume or reject an executory contract is typically given deferential treatment by bankruptcy courts under a "business judgment" standard. Certain types of nondebtor parties to such contracts, however, have been afforded special protections. For example, in 1988, Congress added section 365(n) to the Bankruptcy Code, granting some intellectual property licensees the right to continued use of licensed property, notwithstanding a debtor's rejection of the underlying license agreement.
The ability of a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) or bankruptcy trustee to assume or reject unexpired leases or contracts that are “executory” as of the bankruptcy filing date is one of the most important entitlements created by the Bankruptcy Code. It allows a DIP to rid itself of onerous contracts and to preserve contracts that can either benefit its reorganized business or be assigned to generate value for the bankruptcy estate and/or fund distributions to creditors under a chapter 11 plan.
When a retail business becomes a debtor in bankruptcy, it often decides to trim its operations by closing some of its retail stores. This strategy inevitably leaves the debtor with unnecessary leases. Instead of simply rejecting the leases, retail debtors often assume the agreements and assign them to other entities. The assumption and assignment of the unnecessary leases may allow a debtor to avoid potentially significant rejection damage claims from landlords.