In a recent decision,1 Judge Sweet of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed a bankruptcy court decision and refused to recognize under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code either as “foreign main proceedings” or as “foreign nonmain proceedings” the well-publicized liquidations brought in the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands by two Bear Stearns hedge funds (the “Funds”).

Funds' assets in the U.S. has been denied by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. See 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2949, *26 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30 , 2007). The Funds were being liquidated in the Cayman Islands, but the bankruptcy court held that they were not eligible for Chapter 15 relief under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the "Code") because the liquidations were not pending in a country where the Funds had their "center of main interests" or an "establishment" for the conduct of business.

A statutory demand is a formal demand for payment of a debt made by a creditor to a debtor. It may be used as the basis for an application for a petition to wind up a Cayman company.

Service and content of Statutory Demand

The Companies Winding up Rules 2008 (as amended) provide guidance as to the form and content of a statutory demand as well as the mode of service within the Cayman Islands.

A statutory demand should be in the format of CWR Form 1 and must be signed by:

On May 6, 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether so-called“Deprizio waivers,”¹ where an insider guarantor waives indemnification rights against a debtor, can insulate the guarantor from preference liability arising from payments made by the obligor to the lender. The Ninth Circuit held that if such a waiver is made legitimately—not merely to avoid preference liability—then the guarantor is not a “creditor” and cannot be subject to preference liability.

On March 10, 2015, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama issued a memorandum decision in the case of Harrelson v. DSS, Inc. (No. 14-mc-03675), declining to withdraw the reference from the bankruptcy court and holding that the existence of an arbitration agreement and a class action waiver in that arbitration agreement did not require substantial consideration of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).

Facts

Last week, we discussed the complexities of metals exploration chapter 11 bankruptcy cases and addressed several of the notable issues that arise in those cases. The discussion of significant issues continues below.

Imagine: you are a lender that has loaned substantial sums of money to an individual, secured by real property owned by the borrower. After the borrower defaults and negotiations fail, you seek and obtain the appointment of a receiver. But now litigation ensues—about the loan documents, about contract defaults, about interest rates, about foreign law. After a substantial investment of time and money, your trial date draws closer. At some point during this odyssey, your borrower secretly transfers the real property collateral to a newly-created, single-member LLC.

A popular line of thinking among bankruptcy practitioners and commentators holds that substantive consolidation – the combining of assets and liabilities of a debtor and another debtor or non-debtor entity to satisfy creditor claims against both entities ratably from the resulting pool – is an equitable remedy of judicial invention with no specific foundation in the Bankruptcy Code.

The October 15, 2009 decision of the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware in In re Pillowtex opens the door for creditors in the Third Circuit to increase their "new value" preference defense under the "subsequent advance" approach.In re Pillowtex, No. 03-12339 (Bankr. D. Del. filed Oct. 15, 2009).

A trustee’s power to avoid preference payments is circumscribed by the statutory defenses set forth in section 547(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. The "subsequent new value" defense set forth in section 547(c)(4) has three well-established elements:

Parties continue to skirmish over the sufficiency of the “cram-down” interest rate required to confirm a Chapter 11 plan over a secured lender’s objection. Currently bankruptcy courts will give some weight to the “prime plus” formula set forth in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004)(plurality opinion).