The facts behind Mr. Justice Lewison’s recent judgment in Stanford (STANFORD INTERNATIONAL BANK LIMITED [2009] EWHC 1441 (Ch)) have no direct connection with either the British Virgin or Cayman Islands but lawyers there do have particular reason to note the more general principles around the seemingly vexed but important issue of COMI in the context of multi-jurisdictional insolvency.

In a recent decision,1 Judge Sweet of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed a bankruptcy court decision and refused to recognize under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code either as “foreign main proceedings” or as “foreign nonmain proceedings” the well-publicized liquidations brought in the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands by two Bear Stearns hedge funds (the “Funds”).

Funds' assets in the U.S. has been denied by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. See 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2949, *26 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30 , 2007). The Funds were being liquidated in the Cayman Islands, but the bankruptcy court held that they were not eligible for Chapter 15 relief under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the "Code") because the liquidations were not pending in a country where the Funds had their "center of main interests" or an "establishment" for the conduct of business.

On May 6, 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether so-called“Deprizio waivers,”¹ where an insider guarantor waives indemnification rights against a debtor, can insulate the guarantor from preference liability arising from payments made by the obligor to the lender. The Ninth Circuit held that if such a waiver is made legitimately—not merely to avoid preference liability—then the guarantor is not a “creditor” and cannot be subject to preference liability.

On March 10, 2015, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama issued a memorandum decision in the case of Harrelson v. DSS, Inc. (No. 14-mc-03675), declining to withdraw the reference from the bankruptcy court and holding that the existence of an arbitration agreement and a class action waiver in that arbitration agreement did not require substantial consideration of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).

Facts

Desperate times call for desperate measures.  It is not surprising then that a less than scrupulous debtor might be less than candid when disclosing assets and liabilities to a bankruptcy court.  But what happens if an individual debtor is discovered to have concealed assets – possibly fraudulently or in bad faith – and then seeks to exercise his or her statutory right under the Bankruptcy Code to exempt all or a portion of the discovered assets from being available to satisfy creditors?  Can a bankruptcy court in that circumstance look to the bad acts of the debtor as a basi

On 23 February 2011, the Federal Government (Bundeskabinett) adopted the government draft (Regierungsentwurf) of an act (Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur weiteren Erleichterung der Sanierung von Unternehmen) that proposes material changes to the German Insolvency Act (Insolvenzordnung). The government's aim is to modify the economic terms for the restructuring of distressed companies .

In Ogle v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 586 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2009), the Second Circuit has now become the second circuit court of appeals to recently conclude that general unsecured creditors may include postpetition attorneys’ fees as part of their claim when attorneys’ fees are permitted by contract or applicable state law.11

On January 6, 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rendered a decision in the case of Riker, Danzig, Scherer, Hyland & Perretti v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re: Smart World Tech., LLC) that clarifies the implications of a bankruptcy court's "pre-approval" of the terms of a professional's retention by the bankruptcy estate under Sections 327 and 328 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Judgment of the Supreme Court, Chamber One, Number 134/2016, 04 March