The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Unsecured Creditors Committee of Sparrer Sausage Co., Inc. v. Jason’s Foods, Inc., 2016 WL 3213090 (7th Cir. June 10, 2016) expanded the scope of the ordinary course defense in a bankruptcy preference action.  This case provides an excellent road map for a creditors’ rights attorney defending a preference suit and suggests arguments for increasing the payments a creditor can retain even if those payments were made during the 90-day preference period.

Estate professionals are under continued scrutiny. Unlike other professionals, getting paid is not simply a matter of sending a bill. The bankruptcy court, appropriately so, closely oversees the amount and timing of payment of estate professional fees. And proper disclosure under the Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the “Bankruptcy Rules”) is critical for all estate professionals.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently held that “[a]n accurate and complete proof of claim on a time-barred debt is not false, deceptive, misleading, unfair, or unconscionable under the FDCPA.”

In arriving at this holding, the Court declined to follow the Eleventh Circuit’s rulings in Crawford and Johnson.

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion.

An individual Chapter 11 debtor’s “estate was diminishing” with no “reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on July 5, 2016. In re Hoover, 2016 WL 3606918, *2 (1st Cir. July 5, 2016), affirming the bankruptcy court’s conversion of the case to a Chapter 7 liquidation. In a rare appellate decision on the conversion issue, the First Circuit affirmed the finding that the debtor had sold “inventory without replacing it with new inventory or retaining cash sufficient to offset the diminution.” Id. at *3.

While the majority of the cases covered by the Weil Bankruptcy Blog address issues arising in corporate restructurings, cases concerning individual debtors often offer interesting insights into the history and meaning of various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

Until the recent U. S. Supreme Court’s decision in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, __ U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. 1581, 194 L.Ed.2d 655, 84 U.S. L.W. 4270 (2016), there was disagreement in the circuit courts regarding whether a debtor in bankruptcy could be denied a discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) where the evidence of wrongdoing proved the debtor committed actual fraud, but there was no evidence that the debtor made a misrepresentation to the creditor seeking to bar the discharge.

A decision from the United States Supreme Court penned by Justice Sonia Sotomayor adopted a broad reading of “actual fraud” in section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, which excepts from discharge debts “obtained by . . .

Recently, a bankruptcy court in the First Circuit, confronted with whether the debtors’ chapter 12 case could be converted to a chapter 11 case – an issue over which there is split in the case law – determined that the Debtors’ chapter 12 case could not be converted to a chapter 11 case.

Relevant Statutes and Statutory Provisions:

(W.D. Ky. July 7, 2016)

Like most companies that file for chapter 11 protection, many debtors in the health care industry may have outstanding liabilities that have not been finally adjudicated as of the petition date. This can include tort claims based on allegations of medical malpractice, elder abuse, patient dumping, violations of a patient’s bill of right or various other allegations of improper care. Bankruptcy courts can estimate the value of these claims to facilitate the speedy confirmation of a debtor’s plan without subjecting the debtor to a lengthy trial during its restructuring.