Key Points
In the November/December 2014 edition of the Business Restructuring Review, we discussed a decision handed down by the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware addressing the meaning of “unreasonably small capital” in the context of constructively fraudulent transfer avoidance litigation. In Whyte ex rel. SemGroup Litig. Trust v.
The U.S. Supreme Court has handed down two rulings thus far in 2016 (October 2015 Term) involving issues of bankruptcy law. In the first, Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 194 L. Ed. 2d 655, 2016 BL 154812 (2016), the Court addressed the scope of section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, which bars the discharge of any debt of an individual debtor for money, property, services, or credit to the extent obtained by "false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition."
“Just when I thought I was out…they pull me back in.” That must be what GM’s executives (and counsel) were thinking when the Second Circuit handed down its recent decision overturning portions of the 2015 Bankruptcy Court decision that could have immunized the “New GM” from “Old GM’s” liability related to the ignition switch recall of 2014. The decision also calls into question the 2009 sale order as a potential violation of the victims’ due process rights.
In order to confirm a chapter 11 plan, at least one class of creditors whose claims are “impaired” must accept the plan. The concept of “impairment” is very broad. Under the Bankruptcy Code, a class of claims is impaired unless the plan “leaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and contractual rights” to which the holder of the claim is entitled. That alteration can be very modest: payment in full but paid half at confirmation and the other half in 30 days, reduction of the applicable interest rate by one basis point, etc.
In FTI Consulting, Inc. v. Merit Management Group, LP,1 the Seventh Circuit recently held that transfers are not protected under the safe harbor of section 546(e) of the U.S.
In 2014 the Eleventh Circuit held that a debt collector violates the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act when it filed a proof of claim in a chapter 13 case on a debt that it knows to be time-barred. Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Circ. 2014).
Two recent cases serve as reminders the devil is truly in the details.
(Bankr. S.D. Ind. July 29, 2016)
The bankruptcy court denies the debtor’s motion to transfer venue of his chapter 7 bankruptcy case from the Terra Haute Division to the Evansville Division. The debtor failed to satisfy the standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1412 for venue transfer. The debtor’s travel time to each court location was virtually the same, and thus Evansville was no more convenient than Terra Haute. Further, there was no showing that the interests of justice would be better served by the transfer. Opinion below.
Judge: Graham
The Missouri Commercial Receivership Act (MCRA), passed by the Missouri legislature and just signed into law by Governor Nixon, becomes effective Aug. 28, 2016. It expands, clarifies and fleshes out the existing minimal receivership statute. The MCRA (Sections 515.500 through 515.665 of MO Senate Bill No. 578) outlines a new standardized system for receivership administration under the auspices of the Missouri courts.