Compensation of a debt made after the debtor’s bankruptcy declaration via the appropriation of securities pledged by virtue of a financial guarantee, is admitted.

The validity of a transaction assessed as “compensation” that was carried out after the bankruptcy declaration of the company in debt was questioned before the Supreme Court. The credit entity applied the value obtained from the reimbursement of an investment fund that had been pledged to secure a credit policy to reduce the debt.

Whoever acquires control of a listed company due to a conversion of  debts  into  shares directly attributable to a court-sanctioned refinancing agreement will not have to launch a mandatory bid. This exemption applies automatically without the need for a CNMV evaluation.

INTRODUCTION

The Madrid and Barcelona Provincial Courts took different positions on the classification of a creditor’s credit in the insolvency of the joint and several guarantor: the former classed it as an insolvency credit; the latter classed it as a contingent claim.

In 2011, the Spanish legislator introduced the court-sanctioned refinancing agreement (‘Spanish Scheme’) in the Spanish insolvency system. While the introduction of the Spanish Scheme has been praised for providing new tools for debtors to reorganise out-of-court while addressing the collective action problem, certain of its provisions have made this instrument too rigid and, thus, ineffective for tackling Spanish restructurings.

Cuatrecasas, Gonrcalves Pereira has advised one of the coordinating institutions on the process for the acquisition of NATRA debt and on the design and implementation of the refinancing, including the execution of a lock-up agreement.

Debt exchanges have long been utilized by distressed companies to address liquidity concerns and to take advantage of beneficial market conditions. A company saddled with burdensome debt obligations, for example, may seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with the same outstanding principal but with borrower-favorable terms, like delayed payment or extended maturation dates (a "Face Value Exchange"). Or the company might seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with a lower face amount, motivated by discounted trading values for the existing notes (a "Fair Value Exchange").

The ongoing global financial crisis has resulted in a number of debt restructuring transactions as a result of companies being unable to meet with their debt obligations. In distressed situations, issuers typically seek investor consent to amend existing terms and conditions, often to relax covenants, reschedule payments, limit events of default and remove restrictions on raising further capital.

It is not surprising that within an economic outlook which seems permanently set to "gloomy" many companies are having to think about reorganising their operations or restructuring their holding structures This article highlights some of the tax and other considerations which must be borne in mind when considering such reorganisations or restructurings with reference to some recent (and less recent) cases and changes in the law and points which have come to the fore in the current climate.

Recapitalisations

Aim of the Reform

On March 8, 2014, Spain enacted urgent measures to govern refinancing and restructuring of corporate debt ("RDl 4/2014"), modifying several provisions of the Spanish Insolvency Act (the "Act"). The objective of the reform is to improve the legal framework that governs refinancing agreements to remove obstacles that have previously impeded the successful execution of restructuring and refinancing transactions. 

Principal Amendments

On May 15, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued a decision^[1]  in the much-watched litigation involving the residential construction company, TOUSA, Inc. ("TOUSA"). The decision reversed the prior decision of the District Court, ^[2] reinstating the ruling of the Bankruptcy Court.^[3]

Background