In 2011, the Spanish legislator introduced the court-sanctioned refinancing agreement (‘Spanish Scheme’) in the Spanish insolvency system. While the introduction of the Spanish Scheme has been praised for providing new tools for debtors to reorganise out-of-court while addressing the collective action problem, certain of its provisions have made this instrument too rigid and, thus, ineffective for tackling Spanish restructurings.
Act 14/2013, of September 27, 2013, favoring entrepreneurs and their internationalization (the “Act”), introduces a wide range of reforms on insolvency, corporate, tax and labor matters. Regarding insolvencies, it takes a more flexible approach to the quorum of financial creditors required for court-sanctioned refinancing agreements and it regulates out-of-court agree-ments for payment as mechanisms for out-of-court negotiation with creditors.
REFINANCING AGREEMENTS
Guarantees granted by a group company for securing a loan used to repay the insolvent party’s personal debts are detrimental to the insolvency estate. Article 10 of the Mortgage Market Act refers solely to mortgages that are already part of an issue of mortgage securities.
Compensation of a debt made after the debtor’s bankruptcy declaration via the appropriation of securities pledged by virtue of a financial guarantee, is admitted.
The validity of a transaction assessed as “compensation” that was carried out after the bankruptcy declaration of the company in debt was questioned before the Supreme Court. The credit entity applied the value obtained from the reimbursement of an investment fund that had been pledged to secure a credit policy to reduce the debt.
Cuatrecasas, Gonrcalves Pereira has advised one of the coordinating institutions on the process for the acquisition of NATRA debt and on the design and implementation of the refinancing, including the execution of a lock-up agreement.
Section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code provides, subject to certain exceptions, that the Bankruptcy Code “does not affect any right of a creditor to offset a mutual debt owing by such creditor to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title against a claim of such creditor against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case.” Debts are considered “mutual” when they are due to and from the same persons or entities in the same capacity.
During the last few years, Italian bankruptcy law has been shifting from a traditional "procedural/judicial" model, based on the central role of courts called upon to safeguard the "public interest" involved in bankruptcy by actively directing the procedure and making the most important decisions, to a model that recognizes the private interests of creditors. Under the new paradigm, creditors are conferred with decisional powers, while courts maintain a principally supervisory role.
For the third time in as many years, the Delaware Chancery Court has handed down an important ruling interpreting the interaction between federal bankruptcy law and Delaware corporate law. The thorny question this time was whether a bankruptcy court’s determination that the directors of a corporation acted in good faith when they authorized a chapter 11 filing precluded a subsequent claim that the directors breached their fiduciary duties by doing so. The Delaware Chancery Court concluded that it did, ruling in Nelson v.
On June 24, 2013, Argentina filed a petition asking the U.S. Supreme Court to review a ruling handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on October 26, 2012 (see NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012)) upholding a lower-court order enjoining Argentina from making payments on restructured defaulted debt without making comparable payments to holdout bondholders. On July 26, 2013, the French government filed an amicus curiae (“friend of the court”) brief supporting Argentina’s petition.
Earlier this year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided in In re Lett that objections to a bankruptcy court’s approval of a cram-down chapter 11 plan on the basis of noncompliance with the “absolute priority rule” may be raised for the first time on appeal. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that “[a] bankruptcy court has an independent obligation to ensure that a proposed plan complies with [the] absolute priority rule before ‘cramming’ that plan down upon dissenting creditor classes,” whether or not stakeholders “formally” object on that basis.