The Slovak Ministry of Justice was very busy last year, and the recent amendment to the Commercial Code introduces a number of provisions that are aimed at fixing local malpractice related to mergers and liquidation of companies, use of “straw men” as executives and the impact of bad decisions of shareholders on the local affiliates.

In a previous post, we covered the topic of increased liability of executives for not filing the petition for bankruptcy. However, the Ministry of Justice did not stop just there.

Corporate Veil Pierced

The New Law Aims at Protecting Entities against the Negative Effects of Insolvency by their Majority Owners

Since gaining its independence in 1993, the Slovak Republic has adopted new laws at a rapid pace. As a country in transition, its legal system continues to develop.

On 19 February 2019, the African Global Group of companies (better known by its trading name, Bosasa) reported that it intends applying for its voluntary liquidation.

It reported that this decision was taken by the board of directors of Bosasa after being notified by its bankers that the groups’ bank accounts would be closed, with effect from the 1st of March 2019.

Somewhere close to Sandton – Africa’s richest square mile – lies the suburb of Parkmore in the Gauteng Province. This is the principal place of business of a debtor that cannot pay its debts, and is facing the barrel of an application for its winding-up. The debtor’s registered address is in Mbombela within the province of Mpumalanga – close to Africa’s Big Five game. Two court options come into play.

Chapter 6 of the South African Companies Act, 2008, as a corporate restructuring regime, provides a formal restructuring tool for financially distressed (which exists when a company is unable to pay its debts as they fall due (cash-flow insolvency) or when a company’s liabilities exceed the value of its assets (balance-sheet insolvency) or when those events are likely to occur in 6 months (imminent insolvency) companies.

It has been long-established by the classic fundamental principles of corporate law that companies are separate and distinct persons from their shareholders, directors and officers. From this flows the general principle that it is the company, and the company alone, that can be liable for its obligations. This holds even in cases of companies linked by direct and indirect share participation and which are, in their entirety, dominated by a parent company, often a mere holding company without any business activity. These are referred to in corporate jargon as “corporate groups”.

It’s an open secret that the commendable goals envisaged by the legislature with the introduction of the business rescue proceedings in Chapter 6 of our Companies Act are being hampered as a result of poorly drafted statutory provisions that govern the business rescue process. Section 141(2)(a)(ii) is however not one of these vague provisions.

Since the inception of business rescue, misconduct by business rescue practitioners (BRPs) has been one of the biggest causes of complaint (and headaches) by creditors. More and more disgruntled creditors and other affected persons are pursuing the removal of rogue BRPs of companies in business rescue.

In terms of section 139 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, a BRP may only be removed from office in terms of section 130, or as provided for in section 139. Furthermore, only the court is authorised to remove a BRP from office, both in terms of sections 130 and 139.

The Policy Framework Behind Section 34 of The Act

The policy of the law is to afford protection to a trader's creditors against his dispossessing himself of his property without paying his debt before the disposition or from the proceeds thereof. This framework policy is well set out in the case of Paterson vs Kelvin Park Properties CC (1998) 1AII SA 22 (E) where it was held:-