In Assured Guaranty Corp. v. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for Puerto Rico, 872 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled that section 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code gave an unsecured creditors’ committee an "unconditional right to intervene," within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1), in an adversary proceeding commenced during the course of a bankruptcy case.
In Clark’s Crystal Springs Ranch, LLC v. Gugino (In re Clark), 692 Fed. Appx. 946, 2017 BL 240043 (9th Cir. July 12, 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that: (i) the remedy of "substantive consolidation" is governed by federal bankruptcy law, not state law; and (ii) because the Bankruptcy Code does not expressly forbid the substantive consolidation of debtors and nondebtors, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188 (2014), does not bar bankruptcy courts from ordering the remedy.
Since its enactment as part of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code has provided an important safety net for creditors selling goods to financially struggling companies that file for bankruptcy. The provision gives vendors an administrative expense priority claim for the value of goods "received by the debtor" during the 20-day period before the bankruptcy petition date. The U.S.
In Momentive Performance Materials Inc. v. BOKF, NA (In re MPM Silicones, L.L.C.), 2017 BL 376794 (2d Cir. Oct. 27, 2017) ("Momentive"), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a long-anticipated decision, affirmed a number of lower court rulings on hot-button bankruptcy issues, including allowance (or, in this case, denial) of a claim for a "make-whole" premium and contractual subordination of junior notes.
In Short
The Situation: Frequently, the statutory moratorium period provided to voluntary administrators to restructure an insolvent company is too short to find a solution. Administrators often utilise "holding" deeds of company arrangement to extend the period of moratorium and "buy" time to investigate potential restructuring opportunities for the future of the company. A creditor recently challenged this industrywide practice by arguing that holding DOCAs are invalid.
syncreon Group Holdings B.V. (the “Company” and together with its subsidiaries, “syncreon”) completed its landmark financial restructuring today. As has been widely reported, syncreon’s reorganization is perhaps the first-ever use of an English scheme to restructure debt issued by a U.S.-based global enterprise. This also appears to be the first time that CCAA recognition of an English scheme has been granted.
The Restructuring
Hoku, a publicly-owned Delaware corporation, filed for bankruptcy with just $8 million in assets compared to a relatively staggering $1.3 billion in liabilities, much of which was funded debt. In light of this significant insolvency, Hoku’s chapter 7 trustee brought various breach of fiduciary claims against Hoku’s board of directors, including one akin to a claim for “deepening insolvency.” As the case of Hopkins v.
A recent decision from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation, Case No. 12-2652, 2019 WL 1771786 (S.D.N.Y. April 23, 2019) (Cote, J.), has re-examined application of the “securities safe harbor” under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532, to the transferees of “financial institutions” in so-called “conduit transactions,” following the United States Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 883 (2018).
We’ve previously commented on this blog on a number of decisions (see: (i) Too Little, Too Late: Ninth Circuit Holds Confirmation Objection Insufficient to Revive Untimely Complaint Objecting to Dischargeability of Debt, (ii)
Whether a contract is executory is an often-litigated issue in bankruptcy because of the treatment afforded to such contracts. Although the Bankruptcy Code does not define the term “executory contract,” most courts follow a variation of the definition provided by Professor Vern Countryman in a 1973 law review article.