In Short

The Situation: Frequently, the statutory moratorium period provided to voluntary administrators to restructure an insolvent company is too short to find a solution. Administrators often utilise "holding" deeds of company arrangement to extend the period of moratorium and "buy" time to investigate potential restructuring opportunities for the future of the company. A creditor recently challenged this industrywide practice by arguing that holding DOCAs are invalid.

syncreon Group Holdings B.V. (the “Company” and together with its subsidiaries, “syncreon”) completed its landmark financial restructuring today. As has been widely reported, syncreon’s reorganization is perhaps the first-ever use of an English scheme to restructure debt issued by a U.S.-based global enterprise. This also appears to be the first time that CCAA recognition of an English scheme has been granted.

The Restructuring

Hoku, a publicly-owned Delaware corporation, filed for bankruptcy with just $8 million in assets compared to a relatively staggering $1.3 billion in liabilities, much of which was funded debt. In light of this significant insolvency, Hoku’s chapter 7 trustee brought various breach of fiduciary claims against Hoku’s board of directors, including one akin to a claim for “deepening insolvency.” As the case of Hopkins v.

A recent decision from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, In re Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation, Case No. 12-2652, 2019 WL 1771786 (S.D.N.Y. April 23, 2019) (Cote, J.), has re-examined application of the “securities safe harbor” under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532, to the transferees of “financial institutions” in so-called “conduit transactions,” following the United States Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 883 (2018).

We’ve previously commented on this blog on a number of decisions (see: (i) Too Little, Too Late: Ninth Circuit Holds Confirmation Objection Insufficient to Revive Untimely Complaint Objecting to Dischargeability of Debt, (ii)

Whether a contract is executory is an often-litigated issue in bankruptcy because of the treatment afforded to such contracts. Although the Bankruptcy Code does not define the term “executory contract,” most courts follow a variation of the definition provided by Professor Vern Countryman in a 1973 law review article.

The question of what constitutes “equal treatment” is a question as old as law itself. Though a favored topic by the Aristotles and the Rousseaus of the world, the question is not entirely esoteric. The concept plays a central role in the law of bankruptcy – courts occasionally describe the principle of equitable distribution between similarly situated creditors as one of the “pillars” of the Bankruptcy Code.

In April 2019, the Institutional Limited Partners Association (“ILPA”) released a set of considerations for Limited Partners and General Partners with respect to General Partner-led secondary fund restructurings (the “ILPA Memo”). The ILPA Memo can be viewed here.

In a typical application of the veil piercing remedy, an equity holder is held liable for the debts of the corporate entity it owns and controls. The tests courts use for determining when the remedy is available vary, but generally veil piercing may occur only where the equity holder has abused the corporate form, by using its control over an entity to commit a fraud or other injustice.

All too often the task of procuring and renewing D&O insurance at a portfolio company is assigned to the portfolio company’s CFO or Controller, who employs an insurance broker to find the best price for the amount of coverage deemed appropriate by the broker. When such insurance is procured and thereafter renewed, the CFO/Controller simply reports to the board the fact of the procurement/renewal and few questions about the terms of coverage are discussed at the board level. This can be a big mistake.