One of the world’s largest cryptocurrency exchanges—FTX Trading Ltd.—and many of its affiliates filed for bankruptcy earlier this month.1 While the full impact of the FTX bankruptcy is not yet clear, various responses from the executive branch and federal and state regulators indicate that, in the short term, agencies will continue to use their existing authorities to seek information about the practices of crypto market participants and to enforce existing rules to protect customers and avoid further market contagion.2 The following statements may indicate what market
Another domino has fallen. Earlier this year, we wrote about the challenges facing the crypto industry that resulted in the bankruptcy filings of Three Arrows Capital, Celsius Network, and Voyager Digital. We noted that other crypto entities could also end up in chapter 11, and that prediction has proven correct.
How did we get here?
The crypto markets were rocked again last week by the collapse and bankruptcy of FTX and Alameda Research. Within a few short days, Sam Bankman-Fried (SBF) and his companies went from a stabilizing force for markets and acting as an industry leader to causing one of the greatest disruptions in digital asset market history.
As discussed in previous installments of this White Paper series, the Lummis-Gillibrand Responsible Financial Innovation Act (the “Bill”)1 proposes a comprehensive statutory and regulatory framework in an effort to bring stability to the digital asset market. One area of proposed change relates to how digital assets and digital asset exchanges would be treated in bankruptcy. If enacted, the Bill would significantly alter the status quo from a bankruptcy perspective
OVERVIEW OF DIGITAL ASSETS IN BANKRUPTCY
Welcome to the October 2022 edition of the HFW Commodities bulletin.
In this extended edition, a number of our partners from across the globe have taken time to reflect on the profound impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on the commodities sector. It includes contributions from our offices in Australia, Geneva, London and Singapore, with articles on energy and food security, sanctions, insolvency, regulation, the energy transition and force majeure.
On the back page, you will find details of the latest news and where you can meet the team next.
The major cryptocurrencies have experienced significant declines in 2022; with the crypto market shedding $2 trillion of its peak $3 trillion market capitalization in November 2021. Amid this “crypto winter,” Terra Luna and its algorithmic stablecoin collapsed, triggering a domino effect of losses and illiquidity throughout the crypto industry. The hedge fund Three Arrows Capital was the first big domino to fall, defaulting on $1 billion in loans including $650 million owed to Voyager Digital (“Voyager”).
It’s been a hard year for cryptocurrency. The values of most cryptocurrencies, including major coins such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, have continued to tumble. In fact, the price of one stablecoin, which is a form of cryptocurrency tied to another currency, commodity or financial instrument, de-pegged from its cryptocurrency token and entered into a downward spiral. Ultimately, the stablecoin and the crypto token it was pegged to collapsed, erasing $18 billion of value with it.
Much discussion has been had recently about the fact that cryptocurrencies (tokens and coins) do not fit neatly into a generally accepted financial asset classification. The value of most cryptocurrencies is not pegged to any tangible commodity or fiat currency.
One year ago, we wrote that, unlike in 2019, when the large business bankruptcy landscape was generally shaped by economic, market, and leverage factors, the COVID-19 pandemic dominated the narrative in 2020. The pandemic may not have been responsible for every reversal of corporate fortune in 2020, but it weighed heavily on the scale, particularly for companies in the energy, retail, restaurant, entertainment, health care, travel, and hospitality industries.
As of November 1, 2021, dealers in security-based swaps (“SBS”) whose dealing activity exceeds certain de minimis thresholds (e.g., gross notional amount of $3 billion for credit default SBS, $150 million for other SBS, and $25 million for SBS where the counterparty is a special entity) are required to register with the SEC as a security-based swap dealer (“SBSD”) and to comply with the SEC’s regulations applicable to SBS.