On May 14, 2009, Judge Allan Gropper of the US Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York, approved a US$400 million DIP financing package in the US$27 billion General Growth Properties, Inc. (“GGP”) Chapter 11 case. Judge Gropper’s ruling also included approval of GGP’s proposal to use cash flow generated by shopping centers, structured by GGP as bankruptcy remote, special purpose entities, to fund GGP’s ongoing central operations while in bankruptcy.  

In the wake of recent bankruptcy filings by several prominent financial institutions, there’s a growing interest in changing standard credit documentation to address the risks of defaulting lenders and nonperforming administrative agents. Here are credit agreement provisions that financial institutions, acting as swingline lenders and letter of credit issuers, can require to protect themselves against the risk of a defaulting lender.

In a recent case,1 the Fifth Circuit emphasized its rule that a creditor's claim may be equitably subordinated to the claims of other creditors only to the extent necessary to offset the harm that the other creditors have suffered, based on specific findings and conclusions.

Background

The Bankruptcy Code limits the amount a landlord may recover from a bankrupt tenant for damages caused by the termination of a lease of real property. But what if the tenant trashes the landlord's property before turning over the premises? Does the damage limitation apply to the landlord's claim for the cost of cleaning up the mess?

The Bankruptcy Code provides that a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization may be confirmed over the opposition of a class of secured creditors whose secured claims are not being paid in full only if it provides one of the following1--

The collapse of Lehman Brothers was a major test of the procedures developed by market participants to address counterparty credit risk and has uncovered deficiencies in risk management policies and their application.

On November 13, 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and its affiliated debtors in Chapter 11 (collectively, “Lehman”) filed a motion (the “Motion”) seeking Bankruptcy Court approval of procedures (the “Procedures”) for the assumption and assignment of derivative contracts not yet terminated by its various counterparties, as well confirmation of Lehman’s right to enter into settlement agreements for the termination of derivative contracts that have been terminated by its counterparties post-petition.

This alert describes issues to consider when a derivatives dealer counterparty becomes insolvent.We address below issues involving termination of a master agreement, close-out netting of underlying trades and collateral. Even though this alert focuses on the bankruptcy of a dealer, many of the issues would also arise in connection with the bankruptcy of most non-dealer counterparties.

1. Existence of an Event of Default and Termination

a. Existence of an Event of Default

On April 9, 2008, in the M. Fabrikant & Sons, Inc. bankruptcy case pending in the Southern District of New York, Chief Judge Stuart M. Bernstein held that a seller of bank debt under the standard LSTA claims transfer documents transfers all of its rights except for those explicitly retained, including unmatured contingent claims, thus giving broad construction to the term “Transferred Rights” under the standard LSTA trade documents.

In a recent decision in the Southern District of New York, the court addressed a challenge to a secured-for-unsecured debt exchange offer that raised and answered a host of questions on the potential vulnerability of offers of this type. In Waxman v. Cliffs Natural Resources (SDNY December 6, 2016), the court dealt with standing to pursue a challenge; TIA §316(b) after Marblegate and MeehanCombs/Caesars; the no-action clause and allegations of conflict of interest of the trustee; the remedies clause; and discrimination against non-QIBs.