The Bottom Line:

The Bottom Line

The Bottom Line:

The Bottom Line:

On January 25, 2010, the U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Peck struck down a provision that used the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (“LBHI”) to trigger subordination of a Lehman subsidiary’s swap claim against a securitization vehicle in the United Kingdom.1

The collapse of Lehman Brothers was a major test of the procedures developed by market participants to address counterparty credit risk and has uncovered deficiencies in risk management policies and their application.

On November 13, 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and its affiliated debtors in Chapter 11 (collectively, “Lehman”) filed a motion (the “Motion”) seeking Bankruptcy Court approval of procedures (the “Procedures”) for the assumption and assignment of derivative contracts not yet terminated by its various counterparties, as well confirmation of Lehman’s right to enter into settlement agreements for the termination of derivative contracts that have been terminated by its counterparties post-petition.

This alert describes issues to consider when a derivatives dealer counterparty becomes insolvent.We address below issues involving termination of a master agreement, close-out netting of underlying trades and collateral. Even though this alert focuses on the bankruptcy of a dealer, many of the issues would also arise in connection with the bankruptcy of most non-dealer counterparties.

1. Existence of an Event of Default and Termination

a. Existence of an Event of Default

On April 9, 2008, in the M. Fabrikant & Sons, Inc. bankruptcy case pending in the Southern District of New York, Chief Judge Stuart M. Bernstein held that a seller of bank debt under the standard LSTA claims transfer documents transfers all of its rights except for those explicitly retained, including unmatured contingent claims, thus giving broad construction to the term “Transferred Rights” under the standard LSTA trade documents.

In the construction industry, contractor insolvency delays projects, increases costs and may deprive the employer of remedies and third parties of meaningful warranty protection. In 2008, it was reported that the number of construction firms facing grave financial concerns was 547 per cent higher than in 2007 (Building, 14 November 2008). As contractor insolvencies are likely to increase in 2009, how can an employer protect its position at the start of a project and when contractor insolvency occurs?  

Contractual safeguards