On April 7, 2011, in the context of a liquidating CCAA that achieved a going concern sale of the debtor’s business, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that:

In Canada, as in the US, corporate debtors are permitted with court approval to obtain DIP financing on a super-priority basis. The Order typically provides protections as hard as a nutshell, including that pension claims cannot crack the shell of protection and are subordinated to the new DIP loan. A recent Canadian decision, however, held that certain pension claims could crack the nut wide open and should be paid ahead of a DIP loan. Re Indalex Limited, 2011 ONCA 265 (Apr. 7, 2011).

Certain provisions of Bill C-9, last year's Budget Bill, which amended the federal Pension Benefits Standards Act (PBSA), have been proclaimed in force.

On April 7, 2011, the Ontario Court of Appeal rendered a decision in the restructuring proceedings involving Indalex Limited (Indalex) under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) that is inconsistent with prior non-binding comments by the same court relating to the priority of certain pension claims. The decision has material implications for institutional financiers that lend against the inventory, accounts receivable or cash collateral of businesses with Ontario regulated defined benefit pension plans and for the access of those businesses to secured credit.

The Ontario Court of Appeal recently addressed the issue of pension deficits in the context of a restructuring under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (the "CCAA"). However, unlike past decisions, in Re Indalex the Court held that such deficits may have priority against monies advanced under interim debtor-in-possession ("DIP") financing agreements authorized by a CCAA judge. This apparent departure from the conventional understanding of the priority of pension deficit claims and related issues should raise concerns for lenders, employers, and plan administrators.

Re Gyro-Trac (USA) Inc. (“Gyro-Trac””) is the first appellate decision to consider the centre of main interests (COMI) of a corporate group. In that case, the Quebec Court Appeal upheld the lower court’s decision to recognize proceedings under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (“Chapter 11”) and to stay Canadian bankruptcy proceedings against Canadian members of a corporate group.

Pursuant to section 38 of theBankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 (the “BIA”) a creditor of the bankrupt estate can obtain the trustee’s right to pursue estate litigation where the trustee refuses or fails to pursue such litigation. In a recent Ontario case, Indcondo Building Corp. v. Sloan [2010], CarswellOnt 9785, the Court of Appeal was asked to determine whether the limitation period for the assigned litigation commences with the trustee’s knowledge of the facts giving rise to the claim or the assignee’s knowledge of those facts.

Advising directors and officers of companies that are in the shadow of insolvency regarding the scope of their personal liability can be a daunting task as directors and officers can be exposed to significant personal liability in a variety of areas of the law. Directors are now accountable not only to the corporation and its shareholders but also under certain circumstances to employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, and governments.

In its recent decision in Century Services Inc v Canada,1 the Supreme Court of Canada (the “SCC”) held that, in the context of a Companies’Creditors Arrangement Act2 (the “CCAA”) proceeding, the Crown does not have a superpriority claim over the property of a debtor for unremitted goods and services tax (“GST”) amounts. The decision of the SCC majority rejected existing appellate-level case law, and brought the priority of Crown claims in-line with what they are in bankruptcy proceedings.

The case of Canrock Ventures LLC v. Ambercore Software Inc. et al is a cautionary tale for a Receiver and its counsel alike. In this case, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice rejected a Receiver’s application for the approval of an asset purchase agreement because of a failure to take the requisite steps when conducting a sale process and, in the Court’s view, failing to remain a neutral officer of the Court.