On March 26, 2012, Judge Mary F. Walrath of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware refused to rule that, as a matter of law, payments made to satisfy a debtor’s obligations under a letter of credit constitute “settlement payments” protected from avoidance under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code. EPLG I, LLC v. Citibank, National Association et al. (In re Qimonda Richmond, LLC, et al.), No. 09-10589, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1264 (Bankr.
When selling assets under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code or pursuant to a plan, debtors typically conduct auctions, selecting the highest or best bidder as the purchaser. Section 363 auctions are intended to enable debtors to maximize the value of their assets, while ensuring "finality and integrity in the process . . . ."1
The comprehensive financial reform bill recently passed by the Senate1 creates a new “orderly liquidation authority” (“OLA”) that would allow the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) to seize control of a financial company2 whose imminent collapse is determined to threaten the financial system as a whole.
In a recent ruling from the bench, Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that Metavante Corporation’s suspension of payments under an outstanding swap agreement with Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc.
Earlier this year, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware ruled that a nondebtor cannot effect a “triangular” setoff of the amounts owed between it and three affiliated debtors, even if the parties had entered into pre-petition contracts that expressly contemplated multiparty setoff.1 In reaching its decision, the Court relied principally on the plain language of section 553(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code, which limits setoff to “mutual” obligations — i.e., direct obligations between a single obligor and obligee.
In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Moran Towing Corp. (In re Bethlehem Steel Corp.),1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that preferential transfer claims were not arbitrable. The Court reasoned that because the avoidance powers did not belong to the debtor, but rather were creditor claims that could only be brought by a trustee or debtor-in-possession, they were not subject to the arbitration clauses in contracts to which the creditors were not parties.
The Dispute and the Arbitration Clauses
As recently reported in our Fall 2007 issue, Judge Lifland’s decision in In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Ltd.,1 limited the ability of offshore funds in financial distress to utilize chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.
In Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Ltd.,1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York refused to allow the foreign representatives of two Bear Stearns funds2 to institute ancillary proceedings under new chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. There, Judge Lifland held that, even though the Funds were in liquidation proceedings in the Cayman Islands, those proceedings constituted neither “foreign main” nor “foreign non-main” proceedings for purposes of the U.S.
ICELAND INTRODUCES A PLAN TO LIFT CAPITAL CONTROLS
In a move that creditors have been waiting patiently forsince 2008, the Icelandic government has finally taken a step towards the lifting of capital controls which were imposed in Iceland after the financial crisis that will impact the main three failed banks;Kaupthing, Landsbanki and Glitnir.
On November 8, 2013, three monoline insurers of the City’s general obligation bonds commenced adversary proceedings in the City of Detroit bankruptcy case.1 Through these actions, the monoline insurers seek to compel enforcement of the status quo for the general obligation bonds by requiring the City to continue to segregate ad valorem taxes in accordance with Michigan law. As these actions progress, they may clarify whether state law protections for general obligation bonds apply in chapter 9 and test the jurisdictional limitations imposed on a bankruptcy court by se