Directors and officers of Delaware corporations face no liability to corporate creditors from direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty, under the Delaware Supreme Court’s recent ruling in North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, (May 18, 2007) (“North American Catholic”).
Arthur C. Clarke famously observed: “Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.” Our regulatory, legislative, and judicial systems illustrate this principle whenever new technology exceeds the limits of our existing legal framework and collective legal imagination. Cryptocurrency, such as bitcoin, has proven particularly “magical” in the existing framework of bankruptcy law, which has not yet determined quite what bitcoin is—a currency, an intangible asset, a commodity contract, or something else entirely.
We at the Bankruptcy Cave are not very surprised by the ruling yesterday in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. The Supreme Court in Jevic reviewed a Bankruptcy Court’s decision to approve a settlement (with a distribution of proceeds that contravened the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme) in conjunction with dismissing the bankruptcy case of the Chapter 11 debtor Jevic Holding Corp.
A recent, and highly publicized, decision from the case formerly known as Sports Authority, In re TSA WD Holdings, Inc. et al., Case No. 16-10527 (MFW), Bankr. D. Del. (Docket #2863, Aug.
Editor’s Note: One of the many fascinating things about restructuring work is its willingness to evolve by borrowing from other areas of the law. Just as business practices change, new financing techniques evolve, and transactions become more complex, the bankruptcy world must adapt as well, to allow for a well functioning insolvency system and not a stilted, out of date process. To that end, we at The Bankruptcy Cave love finding curious decisions in tangential fields of the law, and thinking about how they may change bankruptcy practice, or how bankruptcy pract
On April 1, a bevy of dollar amounts set forth in the Bankruptcy Code will change. Some of these are quite important to substantive relief, and others are quite important to making sure you don’t look bad in front of the client or your favorite (least favorite?) judge. We have Section 104 of the Bankruptcy Code to thank for this malpractice-inducing enterprise, which we enjoy every three years. See 11 U.S.C. § 104 (a) (“On April 1, 1998, and at each 3-year interval ending on April 1 thereafter, each dollar amount in effect under sections . . . shall be adjusted . . . .”).
The Portland Press Herald reports that the bankruptcy trustee for Great Northern Paper has said there is sufficient evidence to pursue claims against the Company’s owners, officers and directors for breach of their fiduciary duties and breach of the duty of loyalty arising from the structuring and execution of a Maine new markets tax credit transaction.
The general rule is that an IRA is exempt from the claims of creditors. Indeed, the Federal Bankruptcy Code provides in Sections 522(b)(3)(C) and 522(d)(12) that a retirement plan, including an IRA and a Roth IRA, is an exempt asset in bankruptcy. However in Green v. Pershing L.L.C., N.D. Okla., No. 4:12-cv-00296-CVE-FHM, 10/22/12, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma ruled that the plan sponsor was not liable for turning over Mr. Green’s entire IRA to the IRS in response to the Notice of Levy and demand the IRS served on Pershing L.L.C. (“Pershing”).
Arthur C. Clarke famously observed: “Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.” Our regulatory, legislative, and judicial systems illustrate this principle whenever new technology exceeds the limits of our existing legal framework and collective legal imagination. Cryptocurrency, such as bitcoin, has proven particularly “magical” in the existing framework of bankruptcy law, which has not yet determined quite what bitcoin is—a currency, an intangible asset, a commodity contract, or something else entirely.
On February 27, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit joined a minority approach followed by District of Columbia Circuit: failing to turn over property after demand is not a violation of the automatic stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362. WD Equipment v. Cowen (In re Cowen), No. 15-1413, — F.3d —-, 2017 WL 745596 (10th Cir. Feb. 27, 2017), opinion here.