Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides a mechanism designed to preserve the creditor/shareholder risk allocation paradigm by categorically subordinating most types of claims asserted against a debtor by equityholders in respect of their equity holdings. However, courts do not always agree on the scope of this provision in attempting to implement its underlying policy objectives. In In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., 2017 WL 1718438 (2d Cir.
In In re Abeinsa Holding, Inc., 2016 BL 335099 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 6, 2016), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware addressed what it perceived to be a flaw in the approach that many courts apply to motions for relief from the automatic stay.
Today’s post covers a recent decision by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas in the Chiron Equities, LLCcase. In that case, the court ordered a preliminary injunction to stop non-bankruptcy court litigation in a dispute between a majority shareholder, a minority shareholder, and his wife.
The scope of the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor for certain financial contracts has been tested again, this time in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Louisiana. The question this time was whether an ipso facto provision continues to be safe harbored if enforcement of that provision is conditioned on other factors – in this case, the debtor’s failure to perform under the contract.
On 24 November 2009, ASIC released Consultation Paper 124 which provides guidance for directors on their duty to prevent insolvent trading which is imposed by section 588G of the Corporations Act 2001.
The economic climate over the past two years has seen a growing number of corporate insolvencies. There is also evidence that directors, and particularly directors of small to medium size enterprises, do not fully understand their duty to prevent insolvent trading.
Introduction
The High Court recently considered, in European Bank Limited v Robb Evans of Robb Evans & Associates, the nature and extent of a "usual undertaking as to damages" given by a receiver in accordance with Part 28, rule 7(2) of the Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW). In doing so, it overturned the decision of the NSW Court of Appeal to reinstate the trial judge's finding that the receiver was liable for substantial losses suffered by a third party deprived of the funds which were at the heart of the dispute.
Background
The following is a broad overview of the duties and liabilities of directors when their company is in financial difficulties. It is a general guide only and there will be variations according to the specific laws in each jurisdiction.
What is a debt restructuring?
The aim of any restructuring (also sometimes called a workout) is to rearrange the debtor’s financial commitments so that it is able to service its restructured debts and survive as a going concern. It is important to note that this is a consensual process and is not undertaken under the supervision of a court or other supervisory body - therefore, it is important the all creditors are involved.
If it’s voluntary, how does it work?