January 8, 2008 A Delaware bankruptcy court decided on Friday that mortgage servicing rights could be severed from a mortgage loan repurchase agreement that fell within applicable safe harbors of the Bankruptcy Code, at least where the loans were transferred “servicing retained.” The decision isCalyon New York Branch v. American Home Mortgage Corp., et al. (In re American Home Mortgage Corp.), Bankr. Case No. 07-51704 (CSS) (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 4, 2008).

FCStone, a New York-based commodities brokerage firm, was recently ordered to return a transfer of $15.6 million to the bankruptcy estate of Sentinel Management Group. Approximately $1.1 million of this amount constituted a prepetition transfer of proceeds the debtor obtained from the sale of securities, which proceeds the debtor distributed to a certain segment of its customers, including FCStone.

On May 15, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a ruling by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida, which required certain lenders to return $403 million in prepetition payments they had received from TOUSA, Inc.

On September 21, 2010, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited leave to appeal a decision of the Bankruptcy Court in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy case.1 The Bankruptcy Court held that a key provision of certain transaction documents constituted an unenforceable ipso facto clause. The District Court granted leave to appeal the Bankruptcy Court decision even though it was interlocutory.

On January 25, 2010, Judge James M. Peck of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that provisions in a CDO indenture subordinating payments due to Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc., as swap provider, constituted unenforceable ipso facto clauses under the facts and circumstances of this case. The Court also held that, because the payment priority provisions were not contained in the four corners of a swap agreement, the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor protections, which generally permit the operation of ipso facto clauses, did not apply.

Metropolitan Insurance Company has joined ING Clarion Capital Loan Services, Inc., Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., and FRM Funding Company, Inc in requesting the Bankruptcy Court to dismiss as bad faith filings the bankruptcy cases of twenty-one property level CMBS borrower subsidiaries of General Growth Properties, Inc. ING filed the first motion on May 4th with respect to eight debtors, and a hearing was set for May 27th. That hearing was subsequently adjourned to June 17th. Creditors having similar motions to be heard on June 17th were required to file their motions to dismiss by May 29th .

In Giant Eagle, Inc. v. Phar-Mor, Inc.,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a lessor-claimant whose lease was rejected pursuant to section 365(a) of Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code was entitled to a claim for future-rent damages against the debtor, even though the lessor had entered into a nearly identical substitute lease. The Court concluded that efforts to mitigate damages by the lessor would not be considered in reducing the actual damage claim when those efforts failed to reduce the actual harm suffered by the lessor.

A recent federal district court appellate decision issued in the Enron chapter 11 case1 has ruled that the postpetition transfer of a prepetition bankruptcy claim from one party to another may insulate the transferred claim against certain types of attack based solely on conduct by a prior holder of the same claim. Whether a particular claim is protected depends upon how the claim was transferred.

In Mission Product Holdings, the Supreme Court Endorses “Rejection-as-Breach” Rule and Interprets Broadly the Contract Rights that Survive Rejection

On September 18, in an en banc review, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit overruled, in part, seminal casesBarger v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003) and Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2002), adopting a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis when facing questions of judicial estoppel.