The United States District Court for the District of Delaware recently affirmed a Bankruptcy Court decision that invalidated the use by creditors of so-called “triangular”, or non-mutual, setoffs in which obligations are offset among not only the parties to a bilateral contract but also their affiliates. In re SemCrude, L.P., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42477 (D. Del.

As is now well known, General Motors, Inc. and Chrysler LLC financially restructured themselves with the help of the United States Treasury. These restructurings occurred very quickly – Chrysler and GM each filed for bankruptcy and sold substantially all of their automobile-producing assets to newly created companies2 within approximately forty days. Each company used the bankruptcy process to massively deleverage and free itself from personal injury liability claims.

In recent opinions, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have revisited the doctrine of equitable subordination and have underscored the requirement that, before a court can equitably subordinate a creditor’s claim, the court must find that other creditors have been harmed by the actions of the creditor. Importantly, both decisions stress that equitable subordination is meant to be remedial and not punitive, and may not be imposed merely because a creditor has engaged in misconduct.

In the January 2008 issue, we reported on In re Solutia, Inc.,1 decided by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. The Solutia court demonstrated how contractual entitlements of debt instruments may be altered in bankruptcy. There, the original issue discount of certain secured notes was found to be interest, rather than principal, causing a significant portion of the noteholders’ claims to be disallowed. In In re Urban Communicators PCS, Ltd.

On August 28, 2012, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas vacated a series of bankruptcy court rulings that had blocked Vitro SAB’s noteholders from filing involuntary bankruptcy petitions against Vitro’s non-debtor subsidiary guarantors.  In a decision authored by Chief Judge Sidney A.

In two recent decisions, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has interpreted narrowly certain of the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provisions.  

On May 5, 2009, Judge James Peck, the Bankruptcy Judge in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy cases, held that the safe harbor provisions of the Bankruptcy Code do not override the mutuality requirements for setoff under section 553(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. As a consequence, the Bankruptcy Court prohibited Swedbank, a non-debtor counter party to a swap agreement, from setting off pre-petition claims against Lehman against funds collected for Lehman’s account postpetition. See In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Bankr. Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

Introduction

The High Court1 in England has confirmed the validity under English law of contractual provisions common in structured finance transactions which subordinate payments to a swap counterparty in circumstances where the swap counterparty has defaulted on its obligations under the terms of the relevant swap agreement.

The Judgment

Parties

In ABN Amro Bank N.V. v. Parmalat Finanziara S.p.A. (In re Parmalat Finanziara S.p.A.),1 the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s entry of an injunction pursuant to former section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code (the precursor to current chapter 15, applicable in crossborder insolvency proceedings), which prevented the beneficiary of a guaranty governed by New York law from asserting its guaranty claim against Italian debtor (and guarantor) Parmalat S.p.A. (“Parmalat”) in the United States.

A recent decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York underscores the risk to junior creditors of not understanding fully the scope of consent given to a senior creditor to modify its senior lending arrangements with a debtor under the terms of an intercreditor agreement. In Buena Vista Home Entertainment, Inc. v.