The question, “Can we get them to agree not to file bankruptcy in the future?” must be near the top of the list of questions clients most commonly ask their transactions and workout lawyers.
Most lawyers fielding this question are likely to explain that such an agreement is not enforceable under bankruptcy law. Good lawyers then suggest that in certain situations, an agreement for the entry of an order lifting the automatic bankruptcy stay, or an agreement not to oppose a lift-stay motion if the other side files a bankruptcy petition, may be enforceable.
Adjustable rate mortgages began to reset just as the economic outlook for subprime borrowers soured. Defaults on subprime debt inevitably followed. The onslaught of litigation against all players in the subprime lending arena followed just as inevitably.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcies and restructurings involving partners and partnerships1 raise a number of unique tax issues. While the IRS has provided guidance with respect to a number of these issues, a surprising number of unresolved issues remain. The first part of this outline summarizes the state of the law with respect to general tax issues that typically arise in connection with partner and partnership bankruptcies and restructurings. The balance of the outline discusses tax issues that arise under Subchapter K when troubled partnerships are reorganized.
With the possibility of a major stock brokerage liquidation appearing more likely than it has been in recent periods, the effect of a liquidation on customers and financial counterparties has become of great interest to many of our clients and others.
In March 2008, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided In re Airadigm Communications, Inc. (Airadigm Communications, Inc. v. FCC),1 a case that built upon the Supreme Court’s decision in FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications, Inc (“NextWave”).2 In NextWave, the Supreme Court held that the FCC’s participation in a bankruptcy proceeding is subject to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
Introduction
In Oneida Ltd. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (In re Oneida Ltd.),1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York addressed whether a premium payment created by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (“DRA”)2 for pension plans terminated as part of a chapter 11 restructuring is a pre-petition claim or a post-petition administrative expense. The Court held that the statutorily mandated premium payment was a contingent pre-petition claim and was discharged upon confirmation of the debtor’s plan.
Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that claims for “damages arising from the purchase or sale of . . . a security” of the debtor or an affiliate of the debtor are subordinated to any claims not based on stock. 11 U.S.C. § 510(b). Because there is rarely enough value in a bankrupt company to satisfy all claims, a determination that a particular claim is subject to mandatory subordination under section 510(b) means that, as a practical matter, the claim is unlikely to receive any distribution from the estate.
In May of 2006, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Chicago, Illinois, issued an 89-page opinion finding that a common stock valuation performed by KPMG (n/k/a BearingPoint) was reasonable and appropriate. The valuation had been performed in September 2000 of high-tech start-up Nanovation Technologies, Inc. After Nanovation filed for bankruptcy in 2001, the bankruptcy trustee sued BearingPoint, alleging that the valuation had been negligently performed and had grossly overvalued the stock.
A federal district court in Michigan has affirmed a bankruptcy court’s refusal to accept a higher bid for various estate assets because the bid was made after the close of the auction, albeit prior to the hearing to confirm the auction results. Evangelista v. Opperman (In re Sebert), No. 07-15509 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 11, 2008).
On June 16, 2008, Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the court in Florida Department of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and held that § 1146(a) provides an exemption to state stamp taxes only where a sale occurs pursuant to a plan that has been confirmed, and did not properly apply to a case where the plan was confirmed several months after the bankruptcy court approved the sale.