Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that claims for “damages arising from the purchase or sale of . . . a security” of the debtor or an affiliate of the debtor are subordinated to any claims not based on stock. 11 U.S.C. § 510(b). Because there is rarely enough value in a bankrupt company to satisfy all claims, a determination that a particular claim is subject to mandatory subordination under section 510(b) means that, as a practical matter, the claim is unlikely to receive any distribution from the estate.

In May of 2006, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Chicago, Illinois, issued an 89-page opinion finding that a common stock valuation performed by KPMG (n/k/a BearingPoint) was reasonable and appropriate. The valuation had been performed in September 2000 of high-tech start-up Nanovation Technologies, Inc. After Nanovation filed for bankruptcy in 2001, the bankruptcy trustee sued BearingPoint, alleging that the valuation had been negligently performed and had grossly overvalued the stock.

A recent bankruptcy court ruling is a reminder that bank accounts established for certain specific purposes may not be subject to general setoff rights.

Section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code preserves a creditor’s right of setoff under the Bankruptcy Code. To exercise this right, “mutuality” must exist—i.e., the debtor must owe an obligation to the creditor and the creditor a corresponding obligation to the debtor. Normally a straightforward analysis, determining whether mutuality is present becomes more difficult when there are more than two parties.

The current liquidity drought is pushing more businesses toward some form of financial reorganization. As the restructurings become more frequent, two different trends–one in bankruptcy and the other in private equity–will intersect. The result may surprise dealmakers searching the detritus for investment opportunities.

The “deepening insolvency” doctrine received another blow1 when a federal bankruptcy judge dismissed claims against the former directors and shareholders of a corporation for allegedly covering up massive fraud perpetuated by the business.

Courts faced with the task of unraveling the results of the recent credit crisis are being called upon to scrutinize lending agreements—many of which are complex and often previously uninterpreted. The review of these agreements is a reminder to signatory parties of the importance of fully understanding their obligations upfront.

The question, “Can we get them to agree not to file bankruptcy in the future?” must be near the top of the list of questions clients most commonly ask their transactions and workout lawyers.

Most lawyers fielding this question are likely to explain that such an agreement is not enforceable under bankruptcy law. Good lawyers then suggest that in certain situations, an agreement for the entry of an order lifting the automatic bankruptcy stay, or an agreement not to oppose a lift-stay motion if the other side files a bankruptcy petition, may be enforceable.

Adjustable rate mortgages began to reset just as the economic outlook for subprime borrowers soured. Defaults on subprime debt inevitably followed. The onslaught of litigation against all players in the subprime lending arena followed just as inevitably.

I. INTRODUCTION

Bankruptcies and restructurings involving partners and partnerships1 raise a number of unique tax issues. While the IRS has provided guidance with respect to a number of these issues, a surprising number of unresolved issues remain. The first part of this outline summarizes the state of the law with respect to general tax issues that typically arise in connection with partner and partnership bankruptcies and restructurings. The balance of the outline discusses tax issues that arise under Subchapter K when troubled partnerships are reorganized.

On June 16, 2008, Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the court in Florida Department of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc. In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and held that § 1146(a) provides an exemption to state stamp taxes only where a sale occurs pursuant to a plan that has been confirmed, and did not properly apply to a case where the plan was confirmed several months after the bankruptcy court approved the sale.