Deutsche Bank held an under-secured home mortgage from a Chapter 13 debtor. The debtor was in arrears, but wanted to retain possession and control of her home. Thus, in her Chapter 13 plan, the debtor proposed to cure the arrearage, as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1322(e). The problem, however, was that the parties could not agree on the arrearage amount.

On September 30, 2010, in In re American Safety Razor, LLC, et al, Case No 10-12351 (MFW), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware ruled that the debtors’ proposed bid procedures for the sale of the business were unfair and unreasonable. The bid procedures, among other things, provided too much discretion to the debtors in the auction process.

363 Sales in General

Commercial lessors have long enjoyed certain individualized protections under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Third Circuit’s recent decision in In re Goody’s Family Clothing, Inc., __ F.3d ___, 2010 WL 2671929 (3d Cir. June 29, 2010), makes it clear that commercial lessors also can take advantage of the more general protections available to creditors to obtain payment for goods and services they provide to a debtor after it files for bankruptcy where the specific protections are not applicable.

Section 365(d)(3)

In a partial reversal of a decision from Bayou Group LLC's bankruptcy case, the US District Court for the Southern District of New York reconsidered a controversial ruling that sent shivers down the spines of institutional investors in 2008. See In re Bayou Group , LLC, No. 09 Civ. 02577 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2010).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Court recently affirmed a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel that held that a bank which loaned an individual the funds to buy a motor vehicle could not overcome the avoidance of its lien as a preferential transfer after the person filed for bankruptcy. The Court so found because the lien at issue was not perfected under Kentucky law within the time frame necessary to be considered an exception to the avoidance of preferential transfers under the Bankruptcy Code.

Introduction

In the W.R. Grace bankruptcy, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently reaffirmed its prior rulings on the controversial issue of a bankruptcy court’s power to enjoin actions by third parties against non-debtors.1 Resting on prior precedent, the Third Circuit held that bankruptcy courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin third party actions that have no direct effect upon the bankruptcy estate.

The concurring opinion in a recent Third Circuit Court of Appeals case1 suggests that trademark licensees may be able to retain their rights in bankruptcy cases, even if licensors reject the license agreements. The majority did not consider whether the licensee could retain its rights. Instead, the majority held that the trademark license was not an executory contract; therefore, it could not be rejected under the Bankruptcy Code. The majority opinion applies narrowly to circumstances involving perpetual, exclusive, and royalty-free trademark licenses.

On October 21, 2010, the Ninth Circuit overruled what many thought to be well-settled law, and held that a bankruptcy trustee does not have standing to pursue alter ego claims, at least in cases governed by California law. The court first held that California state law does not recognize a general alter-ego cause of action that allows an entity and its equity holders to be treated as alter egos for purposes of all of the entity’s debts.

On October 28, 2010, Banning Lewis Ranch Co. LLC and Banning Lewis Ranch Development I & II, LLC (collectively, "Banning"), filed chapter 11 petitions for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. A copy of one of the Banning bankruptcy petition is available here for review. Banning owns over 21,000 acres of land situated on the east side of Colorado Springs, Colorado.