Bankruptcy lawyers who are regularly involved in distressed m&a deals have been wondering for the past few months about the potential fallout from Philadelphia Newspapers.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York’s dismissal of a complaint brought by Rosenman Family, LLC, an investor with Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (BLMIS), against the trustee of BLMIS’s estate. The complaint alleged that Rosenman was entitled to a return of $10 million it wired to BLMIS, because, Rosenman argued, the funds were stolen or embezzled by BLMIS and thus never became BLMIS’s property and/or part of BLMIS’s bankruptcy estate.

The Slippery Slope to Fraud

In this detailed and insightful report, the Center for Audit Quality details how financial-accounting fraud can sometimes creep up on a company that would never have expected to become so embroiled in it.

Big, Broad Bankruptcy Bill

In the W.R. Grace bankruptcy, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently reaffirmed its prior rulings on the controversial issue of a bankruptcy court’s power to enjoin actions by third parties against non-debtors.1 Resting on prior precedent, the Third Circuit held that bankruptcy courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin third party actions that have no direct effect upon the bankruptcy estate.

The concurring opinion in a recent Third Circuit Court of Appeals case1 suggests that trademark licensees may be able to retain their rights in bankruptcy cases, even if licensors reject the license agreements. The majority did not consider whether the licensee could retain its rights. Instead, the majority held that the trademark license was not an executory contract; therefore, it could not be rejected under the Bankruptcy Code. The majority opinion applies narrowly to circumstances involving perpetual, exclusive, and royalty-free trademark licenses.

On October 21, 2010, the Ninth Circuit overruled what many thought to be well-settled law, and held that a bankruptcy trustee does not have standing to pursue alter ego claims, at least in cases governed by California law. The court first held that California state law does not recognize a general alter-ego cause of action that allows an entity and its equity holders to be treated as alter egos for purposes of all of the entity’s debts.

On October 28, 2010, Banning Lewis Ranch Co. LLC and Banning Lewis Ranch Development I & II, LLC (collectively, "Banning"), filed chapter 11 petitions for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. A copy of one of the Banning bankruptcy petition is available here for review. Banning owns over 21,000 acres of land situated on the east side of Colorado Springs, Colorado.

On September 15, 2010, the House Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law voted 8-4 to report H.R. 4677 to the full House Judiciary Committee. Called the “Protecting Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies Act of 2010,” H.R. 4677 contains several substantial changes to federal law aimed at preserving workers’ wages and benefits during a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. The subcommittee members voted along party lines, indicating that the bill will have a difficult fight in the full committee – its fate may ultimately depend on the result of the recent election.

Recently, over 180 adversary actions were filed in the MPC Computers bankruptcy. The adversary actions fall generally in to two categories - preference actions filed by MPC's Committee of Unsecured Creditors and breach of contract actions filed by MPC. This post will look briefly at why MPC filed for bankruptcy and discuss what may happen next now that the adversary actions are underway.

Background on the MPC's Business and Events Leading to Bankruptcy

A New York bankruptcy judge held on October 4, 2010, that second lien lenders could object to a debtor’s bid procedures approved by the first lien lenders despite the terms of an intercreditor agreement inIn re Boston Generating, LLC, No. 10-14419 (SCC) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2010).1 The intercreditor agreement provided the first lien lenders with the “exclusive right to…make determinations regarding the…sale” of the collateral. According to the court, however, the agreement did not expressly preclude the second lien lenders from objecting to bid procedures.