On May 5, 2009, Judge James Peck, the Bankruptcy Judge in the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy cases, held that the safe harbor provisions of the Bankruptcy Code do not override the mutuality requirements for setoff under section 553(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. As a consequence, the Bankruptcy Court prohibited Swedbank, a non-debtor counter party to a swap agreement, from setting off pre-petition claims against Lehman against funds collected for Lehman’s account postpetition. See In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Bankr. Case No. 08-13555 (JMP) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

A recent Delaware bankruptcy court decision1 on the ability of “bankruptcy remote” single-purpose entities emphasizes the complicated nature of the bankruptcy process and the issues that need to be considered when using “bankruptcy remote” entities in funding structures. Given the prevalence of such entities, this is an important decision for all participants in the structured fi nance industry.

Credit bidding has become a really hot issue recently. For those of us who don't normally work on bankruptcy matters, the right to credit bid is an important right that secured lenders usually have in a bankruptcy proceeding. If you're the senior secured lender and you want to buy the company's assets in a bankruptcy sale, you can show up at the auction and, instead of bidding cash, you can place credit bids.

These are tough times in the hotel business. The recession has squeezed room rates and net operating income. The credit crunch means new borrowing is available only at lower loan to value ratios near 50%, on already beaten down values. At the same time, many tens of billions of dollars of existing hotel loans are maturing or otherwise in default, leaving the owners with little ability to sell or refinance at for amounts sufficient to pay off existing debt.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently issued an opinion in the case of In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. that significantly restricts the scope of setoff rights for energy traders and other participants in derivatives and forward commodity markets. Traditionally, bankruptcy law has required mutuality between the debtor and a creditor as a prerequisite for the exercise of setoff rights by the creditor.

This paper is designed to provide a brief update of recent decisions of note that concern various ethical issues bankruptcy attorneys often encounter, focusing on conflicts of interest and privilege issues.

On May 5, the judge overseeing the bankruptcy case of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc issued an opinion refusing Swedbank AB's request to keep several million dollars in post-bankruptcy Lehman deposits as a setoff against pre-bankruptcy swap termination claims.

Introduction

On May 5th, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued a decision declaring that a party's right to setoff in an International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. ("ISDA") Master Agreement is unenforceable in bankruptcy unless "strict mutuality" exists.

On May 18th, the Second Circuit, applying the Supreme Court's holding in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. U.S., 130 S.Ct. 1324 (2010), reversed a trial court order finding that provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act that prohibit debt relief agencies from advising clients to incur more debt were overbroad and unconstitutional when applied to attorneys.