A creditor’s ability to vote on a plan of reorganization is one of its most fundamental rights in a chapter 11 bankruptcy. For strategic investors in distressed debt, the power to vote—and potentially control a voting class (or obtain a blocking position in that class)— can be a critical tool in maximizing value and return on investment. Investors should be aware, however, that a recent decision by Judge Robert E.

On April 1, 2010, Judge Kevin J. Carey , Chief Judge of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware issued an opinion (the "Opinion") in the Spansion bankruptcy rejecting the Debtor's proposed plan of reorganization.

Despite the prevalence of first-lien/secondlien structures in the loan market over the course of the recently-ended leveraged transaction cycle, fully-litigated cases interpreting the provisions of first-lien/second-lien intercreditor agreements remain something of a rarity. As a result, cases providing guidance on the extent to which customary waivers included in such intercreditor agreements would be enforced are always welcomed by finance practitioners. It comes as no surprise then, that the decision of Judge Peck of the U.S.

In 1999 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals rendered its decision in Calpine Corp. v. O’Brien Environmental Energy, Inc. (In re O’Brien Environmental Energy, Inc.), 181 F.2d 527, denying Calpine Corporation’s request for the payment of a break-up fee after Calpine lost its effort to acquire the assets of O’Brien Environmental Energy out of bankruptcy.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York issued an important ruling on March 1, 2010 in the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA) liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (Madoff Securities), adopting the trustee’s method of determining “net equity” for purposes of distributing “customer property” and Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) funds under SIPA.3

Securities Investor Protection Act

Seeking to have an independent examiner investigate a debtor or its management can be a powerful tool available to creditors and other interested parties in a bankruptcy case. Typically, a party might request that an examiner be appointed if the debtor or its management is suspected of fraud or other misconduct. The low cost associated with making the request, together with recent positive outcomes for requesting creditors, may help to increasingly popularize the use of examiner requests by parties seeking leverage in bankruptcy plan negotiations.

Yesterday, Senate Republicans circulated a brief summary of the Financial Regulatory Improvement and Taxpayer Protection Act, a Republican substitute to the Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010 (S.3217) previously

IN RE: REPOSITORY TECHNOLOGIES, INC

What should be the remedy when a bankruptcy court holds that a security interest is avoidable as a preferential transfer, but the value of the security interest is not readily ascertainable? The Ninth Circuit recently addressed this issue in USAA Federal Savings Bank v. Thacker (In re: Taylors), 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5793 (9th Cir. 2010). The Court held that, since the value of the security interest was not readily ascertainable, the only available remedy is for the bankruptcy court to return the security interest itself, not its value, to the bankruptcy estate.

On April 20, the House Committee on Financial Services held a hearing to discuss public policy issues raised by last month’s report of court-appointed bankruptcy examiner for Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (Lehman Brothers), Mr. Anton R. Valukas. The Committee heard testimony from the following witnesses:

Panel One: