One of the primary objectives of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) is to provide the bankrupt with an opportunity to stay existing creditors and establish a financial “clean slate”. The stay imposed on existing creditors includes creditors with causes of action existing at the time the bankruptcy is initiated. As a result, bankrupts can cause a halt to any existing or potential litigation by assigning themselves into bankruptcy.

Lenders should be aware that a broad definition of “wages” owing to employees of a borrower/customer in bankruptcy or receivership can take priority over what a lender might otherwise believe is its “first ranking charge” against the borrower.

Amendments to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) and related new legislation came into force in the summer of 2008 which were aimed at significantly enhancing and protecting, among other things, employee related claims against bankrupt or insolvent companies. The amendments included a super priority charge over all assets for some, but not all, pension claims as well as a limited priority charge over certain assets for some wages owing to employees, subject to a cap for each employee.

On October 26, 2010, the British Columbia Court of Appeal (the Court) released its decision in Canadian Petcetera Limited Partnership v. 2876 R Holdings Ltd., 2010 BCCA 469 (Petcetera), an important case that addresses the rights of landlords when a tenant has filed a Notice of Intention to make a proposal (NOI) under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the BIA).

In Ferme CGR Enr, senc (Syndic de) 2010 QCCA 719, the Québec Court of Appeal decided that it is not necessary to put the partners of a Québec general partnership into bankruptcy when the partnership itself is put into bankruptcy. In doing so, the court initially relied upon authorities interpreting the relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. In addition, the court supported its decision with an analysis of the legal nature of Québec general partnerships and, as a result, modified the ownership structure of partnerships in Québec.

In Capital One v. Solehdin,1 the Ontario Superior Court of Justice recognized judgments of a Louisiana bankruptcy court and held that they were enforceable in Ontario. The judgments were summary judgments against guarantors under their respective guarantees. The decision is significant – it is one of the first cases where guarantors challenged the recognition and enforcement of such judgments of a foreign bankruptcy court on the basis that the foreign bankruptcy court lacked the jurisdiction to grant the judgments.

The recent Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Murphy v Sally Creek Environs Corporation, 2010 ONCA 312 (“Sally Creek”) is a cautionary tale for Trustees in bankruptcy (“Trustees”) and the counsel who represent them.1 In that case, the Trustee’s fees and those of its legal counsel were drastically reduced on a taxation, a cost award was made against the Trustee personally and the Trustee’s conduct was impugned in a detailed decision of the Bankruptcy Registrar and the Court of Appeal.

CMIC Mortgage Investment Corp v Rodriguez, 2010 BCSC 308; [2010] BCJ No 425

The bankrupt farmer ran an equestrian operation. She acquired two fabric covered barns, with one anchored by solid concrete blocks resting on the ground, and the second anchored into concrete foundations.

Fairbanx Corp v Royal Bank of Canada, 2010 ONCA 385 (Ont CA), on appeal from 2009 CanLII 55376 (Ont SC)

Fairbanx factored accounts for the debtor, Friction Tecnology Consultants Inc. Fairbanx made its Ontario PPSA registration misspelling the name as Technology, with an “H”. Two years later, the debtor obtained a line of credit from the Bank, which correctly named the debtor in its Ontario PPSA registration.

Caines, Re, 2010 NLTD 72

The bankrupt was the holder of a commercial fishing licence. He was discharged from his bankruptcy before the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision inRoyal Bank of Canada v. Saulnier (2008), 298 D.L.R. (4th) 193, in which that Court concluded that a fishing licence was “property” for purposes of the PPSA and BIA.