A Chapter 11 debtor’s financial advisers were entitled to a “Success Fee” based on a percentage of a $50-million “debt-to-equity conversion,” held a split U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on May 4, 2016. In re Valence Technology, Inc., 2016 WL 2587109, *1 (5th Cir. May 4, 2016) (2-1). Key to the opinion was the parties’ concession that the “debt-to-equity conversion qualified as a Private Placement under [their] engagement agreements.” Id., at n.1.

The United States District Court for the District of Delaware, on July 21, 2014, held that an indenture trustee’s late filing of senior claims did not waive the lenders’ contractual subordination rights, reversing the bankruptcy court. In re Franklin Bank Corporation, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98327 (D. Del. July 21, 2014). Nor did the senior trustee’s late filing show inequitable conduct warranting equitable subordination of the tardily filed senior claims to timely filed junior claims.

The U.K. Court of Appeal (the “Court of Appeal”) on Aug. 2, 2010, handed down a long-awaited decision regarding an appeal related to the scope of, and eligibility to receive distributions from, the Lehman Brothers Europe (International) (“LBIE”) pool of client money. Lehman Bros. Int. (Europe) (In Administration) v CRC Credit Fund Ltd. & Ors, [2010] EWCA Civ 917 (appeal taken from the Chancery Division) (U.K.).

“[A] party moving for substantive consolidation must provide notice of the motion to the creditors of a putative consolidated non-debtor,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Sept. 9, 2019. In re Mihranian, 2019 WL 4252115 (9th Cir. Sept. 9, 2019) (emphasis added).

A lender’s (“Lender”) derivative breach of fiduciary duty claims on behalf of Chapter 7 guarantor-Debtors cannot be time-barred because of Lender’s knowledge of the “[d]efendants’ conduct,” held the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware on June 22, 2016. In re AMC Investors, LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80861, *16 (Del. June 22, 2016).

The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington recently construed the terms of a customary loan agreement to preclude certain hedge funds viewed as “acquir[ing] distressed debt and engag[ing] in predatory lending” from voting on a debtor’s plan of reorganization. Meridian Sunrise Village, LLC v. NB Distressed Debt Investment Fund Ltd. (In re Meridian Sunrise Village, LLC), 2014 WL 909219 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 7, 2014).

In a decision to be hailed by buyers of distressed debt and bankruptcy claims on the secondary loan market, on Oct. 15, 2009, the New York Court of Appeals (the “Court”), in a fact-specific ruling, held that an assignment of claim does not violate New York’s champerty statute (forbidding trading in litigation claims) if the purpose of the assignment is to collect damages by means of a lawsuit for losses on a debt instrument in which the assignee holds a pre-existing proprietary interest. Trust for the Certificate Holders of the Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors, Inc.

A bankruptcy trustee was “not entitled to avoid” a secured lender’s “lien under the Bankruptcy Code” (“Code”), held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on Sept. 11, 2019. In re 180 Equipment, LLC, 2019 WL 4296751, *6 (7th Cir. Sept. 11, 2019). The court rejected the trustee’s argument that the lender’s “lien [was] avoidable because the [lender’s] financing statement failed to properly indicate the secured collateral.” Id., at 1.

Creditors of a Chapter 11 debtor asserting “state law, constructive fraudulent [transfer] claims … are preempted by Bankruptcy Code Section 546(e),” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on March 29, 2016. In re Tribune Company Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation, 2016 WL ____, at *1 (2d Cir. March 29, 2016), as corrected.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, on Feb. 21, 2014, affirmed the dismissal of a bankruptcy trustee’s fraudulent transfer complaint against a “warehouse” lender who had been paid by a distressed home mortgage originator several months prior to the originator’s bankruptcy. Gold v. First Tennessee Bank, N.A., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 3279 (4th Cir. Feb. 21, 2014) (2-1). Affirming the lower courts, the Fourth Circuit held that “the bank accepted the payments” from its borrower “in good faith.” Id., at *2.