The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently awarded an oversecured lender post-petition interest on the full amount of its secured claim at the default rate set forth in the lender’s contract (19%) plus compound (PIK) interest up to the aggregate rate of 25% (the maximum rate allowable under New York State usury laws). In re Urban Communicators PCS Limited Partnership, et al., 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 4062 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 12/11/07) (Gerber, B.J.).

“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

A terminated officer of a corporate debtor, who bargained for “18 months of severance ( … $375,000 … ) to ensure that his firing not disrupt [the debtor’s] negotiations for $80 million” of financing gave the debtor “reasonably equivalent value,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on Oct. 15, 2015. In re Adam Aircraft Industries, Inc., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17930, at *27 (10th Cir. Oct. 15, 2015).

The United States Supreme Court unanimously[1] held that secured creditors have a statutory right to credit bid their debt at an asset sale conducted under a so-called "cramdown" plan. RadLAX Gateway Hotels, LLC et al., v. Amalgamated Bank (In re River Road Hotel Partners, LLC),__S.Ct.__ No. 11-166, 2012 WL 1912197 (U.S. May 29, 2012).

District Judge James D. Zagel of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on Nov. 9, 2007, ordered a Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") to "immediately" pay its so-called "commitment" and "DIP Facility Funding" fees. ("Loan Fees"). Arlington LF, LLC, v. Arlington Hospitality, Inc., 2007 WL 3334499 (N.D. Ill. 11/9/07). Reversing the bankruptcy court, the district court held that the DIP was not excused from paying the fees despite the lender's earlier refusal to advance further funds on its $6 million revolving loan agreement ("Revolver"). Id. at 5.

A defendant bank (“Bank”) in a fraudulent transfer suit “could not prove” its “good faith” defense for loan repayments it received after its “investigator discovered [the] fraudulent past” of the Ponzi scheme debtor’s principal but “failed to disclose that past to [the Bank’s account] manager,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on Feb. 8, 2017. Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2248, *28 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2017).

An insolvent corporate subsidiary’s payment of its parent’s contractual obligations was not a fraudulent transfer when “the [subsidiary] Debtor received reasonably equivalent value in exchange for [its cash] transfers,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on Sept. 4, 2015. In re PSN USA, Inc., 2015 WL 5167803, at *7 (11th Cir. Sept. 4, 2015) (per curiam).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, on May 15, 2012, reversed a district court's February 2011 decision that lenders were not liable on a fraudulent transfer claim. In re TOUSA, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9796 (11th Cir. 5/15/12).^[1] It rejected the district court's finding that corporate subsidiaries had received "reasonably equivalent value" when they encumbered their assets to secure a loan made to them and their corporate parent.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on Aug. 30, 2007, affirmed the dismissal of a lender liability class action brought by employees of a defunct originator and seller of mortgages and home equity loans. 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 20791 (2d Cir. August 30, 2007). Agreeing with the district court, the Second Circuit held that the lender was not an "employer" within the meaning of the Worker Adjustment & Retraining Notification Act ("WARN Act"), and thus was not liable to the employees for the sudden loss of their jobs. Id., at *2.

On Jan. 17, 2017, in a closely watched dispute surrounding Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its long-anticipated decision in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Finance Corp. (the “Decision”).[1] In a 2-1 ruling reversing the District Court,[2] the Court of Appeals construed Section 316(b) narrowly, holding that it only prohibits “non-consensual amendments to an indenture’s core payment terms” and does not protect noteholders’ practical ability to receive payment.[3]