Debtors filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 7. The Debtors own and have title to real property ("Property"). Prior to the Petition Date, the husband borrowed $85,000 from Lender. This loan was reflected by a promissory note signed only by the husband, as "Borrower." The term "Note" is defined in the Mortgage as the promissory note signed by Borrower. On the same date, a mortgage granting Lender a mortgage on the Property was executed.
A bank did not engage in “egregious conduct” sufficient to subordinate its lien on equitable grounds, held the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on Dec. 10, 2014. In re Sentinel Management Group, Inc., 2014 WL 6990322 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2014) (“Sentinel IV”). Moreover, because of the bank’s “good faith,” the corrupt borrower’s fraudulent pledging of customer funds to the bank to secure a so-called $312-million rescue loan “cannot be avoided.” Id. at *10.
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently held in Krol v.
Krol v. Key Bank National Association, et al. (In re MCK Millenium Centre Parking, LLC), Adv. No. 14-00392 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2015)
The unitranche financing market has expanded significantly in recent years. Generally, a unitranche deal involves two lenders (or groups of lenders) that provide financing on a “first out” and “last out” basis. In conjunction with the financing, the borrower grants one lien and enters into a single credit agreement and the lenders enter into an “Agreement Among Lenders” (“AAL”). An AAL is similar to an intercreditor agreement and provides for certain rights and remedies of the lenders.
© 2015 Hunton & Williams LLP 1 May 2015 Oak Rock Financial District Court Addresses the Applicable Legal Standard for True Participation Agreements The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York recently applied two tests, the True Participation Test and the Disguised Loan Test, to determine whether agreements were true participation agreements or disguised loans.1 In addition, the District Court noted that the most important question in such a determination is the risk of loss allocation in the transaction, and that if an alleged participant is not subject to the
In an opinion issued today, the Supreme Court held that debtors do not have the right to immediately appeal a bankruptcy court’s decision denying confirmation of a proposed reorganization plan. This decision resolves a circuit split, and confirms the balance of power between debtors and creditors in the plan confirmation process. As the Supreme Court explained, “the knowledge that [a debtor] will have no guaranteed appeal from a denial should encourage the debtor to work with creditors and the trustee to develop a confirmable plan as promptly as possible.”
In re Betchan, 524 B.R. 830 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2015) –
A mortgagee was the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale that took place shortly before the debtor filed bankruptcy. The lender requested relief from the automatic stay in order to evict the debtor on the basis that transfer of the property was completed prepetition so that it was not part of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate.
Chief Judge Cecelia G. Morris of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York decided that banks may not place an administrative freeze, even a temporary one, on the bank account of an individual who files for bankruptcy.