Recently, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) each issued rules related to different aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act. The FDIC published in the Federal Register an interim final rule clarifying how it will treat certain creditor claims under the new orderly liquidation authority (OLA) granted under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act.

A degree of certainty—for the time being—has been restored for participants in the commercial lending and debt trading markets who have been tracking the appeal of a controversial 2009 fraudulent transfer decision in the TOUSA, Inc. bankruptcy case.i On February 11, 2011, Judge Gold of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida quashed (or nullified)ii the bankruptcy court’s decision, which ordered a group of lenders to disgorge $480 million received in connection with loans they extended to a joint venture involving TOUSA, Inc.

The ability of a single asset real estate debtor in a bankruptcy case to utilize a non-consenting secured creditor's cash collateral has been limited by a recent decision from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit in In re Buttermilk Towne Center, LLC, 2010 FED App. 0010P (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2010).

On February 16, 2011, the Third Circuit affirmed a Delaware bankruptcy court's order determining the value of mortgage loans in the context of a 2006 repurchase agreement. Buyer Calyon argued that the mortgage loan portfolio sold to it by American Home Mortgage had a market price of only $670 million, as compared to its $1.15 billion contractual repurchase price, and that American Home Mortgage was required to pay Calyon the $480 million difference under a repo agreement.

In a ruling that borrowers may try to use in seeking to delay foreclosures or bankruptcy proceedings on proofs of claim, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York finds that the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS) lacks authority to assign mortgages.

First, let's get one thing clear. A fraudulent conveyance, despite its name, doesn't necessarily involve fraud, and it certainly doesn't involve driving goods across the state in a wagon pulled by horses.

OK, now that we have that out of the way . . .

Last month we reported on the overwhelming victory of the Transeastern Lenders in their appeal of the decision by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida ordering them to disgorge almost $500 million in loan repayments, pre- and post-judgment interest and professional fees (“TOUSA I“1). That update can be found here.

On February 10, 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York issued a memorandum decision addressing whether the alleged holder of a mortgage loan had sufficient status as a secured creditor to seek relief from the automatic stay to pursue a foreclosure action.1 After resolving the primary issue in controversy on purely procedural grounds and granting the requested relief, the Court analyzed whether an entity that acquires its interest in a mortgage loan through an assignment from Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.

In a second decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida involving secured lenders to bankrupt homebuilder TOUSA, Inc., on March 4, 2011, Judge Adalberto Jordan affirmed the dismissal of fraudulent conveyance claims brought against the lenders on a revolving credit facility. In dismissing those claims, the Bankruptcy Court had emphasized that, because the revolving credit agreement was entered into, and the liens securing it were pledged, well before the company's alleged insolvency, they were immune from fraudulent conveyance attack.

MERS’s authority to assign mortgages was called into question by a bankruptcy court in New York. In re Agard, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 488 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2011). In response to the servicer’s motion for relief from the automatic stay, the debtor challenged the servicer’s standing on the ground that MERS lacked the authority to assign the mortgage to the servicer. Because a state court had previously entered a judgment of foreclosure and sale in favor of the servicer, the court was compelled by the Rooker Feldman doctrine to reject the debtor’s claims.