In the jargon of the secondary bank loan market, loans beneficially owned by participation may be "elevated" to direct assignments once requisite administrative agent and/or borrower consent is obtained. Such "elevations" customarily have been viewed as straightforward transactions -- when completed, the participant simply stands in the shoes of the grantor and becomes the lender of record of the loan on the books of the administrative agent.

Introduction: Earlier this year, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC[1] sent shockwaves through the secured lending community. In a 2-1 decision, the court held that a debtor can confirm a plan of reorganization while denying the secured creditor the opportunity to credit bid for its collateral if the plan provides the lender with the "indubitable equivalent" of its claim.

Manufacturers, distributors and other merchants of goods who sell their products on credit terms routinely accept a high level of risk of defaulted payment from their customers. In good times, credit-related losses are relatively predictable as a percentage of sales and can be offset by variations in pricing and volume across a seller’s sales transactions. Unfortunately, we are far removed from the good times. The prolonged economic slump has resulted in increased payment defaults and a 150 percent rise in business bankruptcies since the summer of 2007.

Industry observers have been waiting to see when bank failures arising out of the recent financial crisis would produce a wave of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) litigation similar to that seen in the early 1990s after the savings and loan crisis. With its second suit in recent months, the FDIC has shown that it will aggressively pursue claims against directors and officers in connection with failed depository institutions.

As we first covered here, Ambac Financial Group Inc., the parent of the ailing Wisconsin-domiciled bond insurer Ambac Assurance Corp., filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief with United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York on November 8, 2010.

We are seeing more and more challenges by borrowers to swaps. No big surprise since, with falling interest rates over the past few years, the borrowers are on the wrong end of the transactions. Although swaps are considered independent of the loans, they are often secured by the same collateral and are usually crossdefaulted with the loans, so the obligations that arise from early termination (which can be significant) become part of the collection process and are being fought vigorously by borrowers.

In the case of banking institutions dealing with the unique world of insurance insolvency, the results may not be as dramatic as in other cultural clashes, but they can be equally confused. This is because insurance insolvency operates in its own separate world, where the usual rules of bankruptcy do not apply and where, without appropriate safeguards, having a secured claim may not guarantee repayment. For banks and other secured creditors, lending to insurance companies is governed by a separate set of rules to which careful attention must be paid.

Generally speaking, Massachusetts is a non-judicial foreclosure state – meaning that lenders can foreclose on mortgages of Massachusetts property without seeking judicial approval beforehand. In certain circumstances, however, a pre-foreclosure judicial proceeding is required solely to determine whether the borrower is in the active military service and entitled to the protections of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. §532.

In In re Rodriguez, No. 09-2724 (3rd Cir. Dec 23, 2010), a three-judge panel for the Third Circuit considered whether an automatic stay under the Bankruptcy Code prevented a mortgage servicer from accounting for a pre-petition shortage on a mortgage escrow account in its post-petition calculation of the bankrupt debtors’ future monthly escrow payments. The majority held that the bankruptcy stay did prohibit such conduct by the loan servicer.

In St. Hill v. Tribeca Lending Corp., Case No. 09-2214, 2010 WL 2997724 (3rd Cir. Dec. 8, 2010), the Third Circuit showed that, in determining whether the Truth In Lending Act (TILA) applied to a credit transaction, it would look beyond obvious facts to ascertain a transaction's "primary purpose."