A recent case in the Southern District of New York, U.S. Bank, NA v. T.D. Bank, NA, applied the so-called Rule of Explicitness to the allocation of recoveries among creditors outside of a bankruptcy proceeding. In the bankruptcy context, this rule requires a clear and unambiguous intention to turn over post-petition interest to senior creditors at the expense of junior creditors. The court in this case found the requisite documentary clarity to pay post-petition interest ahead of the distribution of principal.
In a decision last month, DCF Capital, LLC v. US Shale Solutions, LLC (Sup. Ct. NY Co. Jan. 24, 2017), a New York State Supreme Court justice held that a noteholder that had properly accelerated indenture debt may sue to collect that debt notwithstanding the operation of a standard no-action clause. This holding, while appealing from a noteholder perspective, may not be compelled by Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act on which it rests and is contrary to some prior case law.
Background
By now, both indenture trustees and offices of the U.S. Trustee around the country are undoubtedly familiar with the Southern District of New York’s 2014 opinion in the case of In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., 508 B.R. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (Lehman II), finding that individual committee members must establish a “substantial contribution” to the case under Section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code before the payment of their fees will be approved as part of a Chapter 11 plan. In the years since the Lehman II decision, however, U.S.
The United States District Court for the Western District of New York recently granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s first cause of action alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. (“FDCPA”), on the ground that plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead that the communications from defendant were sent in an attempt to collect a debt. SeeBurns v. Seterus, Inc., 2017 WL 104735 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2017). In 2005, plaintiff signed a note and mortgage secured by her residence.
Lender's Security Interest in Funds Lost Upon Transfer to Debtor's Counsel
In In re NewPage Corporation, et al., Adversary Proceeding No. 13-52429 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 13, 2017), a Delaware Bankruptcy Court applied a unique defense to certain preferential transfers targeted by a liquidating trustee. The defense focuses on a commonly overlooked element of a preferential transfer, section 547(b)(5).
Preference 101
A deposit into a checking or savings account seems like a pretty straightforward and innocuous transaction–unless the customer files for bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy trustee starts looking for assets to recover. Bankruptcy trustees will seek to recover money that once belonged to the borrower under various theories including fraudulent conveyance, particularly if the debtor-bank customer was running some sort of Ponzi or investment fraud scheme.
Recently, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that a carve-out provision in a DIP financing order did not act as an absolute limit on the fees and expenses payable to the professionals retained by an unsecured creditors’ committee (the “Committee”). Rather, in In re Molycorp, Inc., 562 B.R. 67 (Bankr. D. Del.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan recently allowed a debtor to modify his confirmed Chapter 13 plan based upon a mistake by the debtor’s counsel. The result of the modification was to reduce the plan to 36 months from 60 and reduce the repayment to unsecured creditors by 80 percent.
A copy of In re Luman is available at: Link to Opinion.
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