U.S. courts generally agree that the substantive consolidation should be applied sparingly, and even more so when substantive consolidation of debtors with non-debtors is sought. While many opinions address the grounds for substantive consolidation, very few cases address standing and notice issues when the sought for consolidation is of non-debtor entities. The Oklahoma bankruptcy court recently addressed these two issues in SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Stewart.

Thousands of mortgage lenders across the country either recently received, or will soon be receiving, this document from Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (LBHI).

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Alabama recently held that a mortgage servicer did not violate the discharge injunction in 11 U.S.C. § 524 by sending the discharged borrowers monthly mortgage statements, delinquency notices, notices concerning hazard insurance, and a notice of intent to foreclose.

Moreover, because the borrowers based their claims for violation of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq., on the violation of the discharge injunction, the Court also dismissed their FDCPA claims with prejudice.

The number of consumer claims filed since the Great Recession has skyrocketed. These claims include alleged violations of an “alphabet soup” of federal and state consumer protection statutes. These statutes allow prevailing plaintiffs to recover some combination of actual damages, statutory damages, and even attorney’s fees. They also present a minimal risk of liability for defense costs if the plaintiff does not prevail, which makes these types of claims enticing for plaintiffs’ attorneys.

The United States Supreme Court recently held that the submission of a proof of claim in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case for payment of a time-barred claim did not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the “Act”). Overturning the decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court explained that the Bankruptcy Code includes certain safeguards which limit the potential for abuse, and thus, the assertion of a time-barred claim in bankruptcy proceedings did not constitute a practice prohibited under the Act.

“The law has long treated unenforceability of a claim (due to the expiration of the limitations period) as an affirmative defense … And we see nothing misleading or deceptive in the filing of a proof of claim that, in effect, follows the Code’s similar system.”

Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, (May 15, 2017).

Earlier this week, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a creditor who deliberately files a bankruptcy proof of claim for a time-barred claim does not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Midland Funding v. Johnson, No. 16-348, 581 U.S. __ (May 15, 2017) (slip op.). The 5-3 decision authored by Justice Stephen Breyer was met with a blistering dissent by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. While the decision will help unscrupulous debt collectors, it will likely hurt legitimate creditors such as banks.

A New York District Court recently tackled the intersection between bankruptcy and pre-petition FDCPA claims and the application of judicial estoppel to undisclosed claims. In December 2013, Jeziorowski filed a complaint alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA). Jeziorowski v. Credit Prot. Assn., L.P., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66084 (W.D.N.Y. 2017). Shortly after filing suit, Jeziorowski filed bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 7.

The Supreme Court of the United States held today that the filing of a proof of claim that is obviously time barred is not a false, deceptive, misleading, unfair, or unconscionable debt collection practice within the meaning of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the "FDCPA").

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision today in Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 581 U.S. ___, No. 16-348, draws attention in passing to a peculiar feature of Wisconsin law on the effect of statutes of limitations.