“The law has long treated unenforceability of a claim (due to the expiration of the limitations period) as an affirmative defense … And we see nothing misleading or deceptive in the filing of a proof of claim that, in effect, follows the Code’s similar system.”

Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, (May 15, 2017).

Earlier this week, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a creditor who deliberately files a bankruptcy proof of claim for a time-barred claim does not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Midland Funding v. Johnson, No. 16-348, 581 U.S. __ (May 15, 2017) (slip op.). The 5-3 decision authored by Justice Stephen Breyer was met with a blistering dissent by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. While the decision will help unscrupulous debt collectors, it will likely hurt legitimate creditors such as banks.

The Supreme Court of the United States held today that the filing of a proof of claim that is obviously time barred is not a false, deceptive, misleading, unfair, or unconscionable debt collection practice within the meaning of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the "FDCPA").

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision today in Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 581 U.S. ___, No. 16-348, draws attention in passing to a peculiar feature of Wisconsin law on the effect of statutes of limitations.

In a May 8, 2017 ruling, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court denied the official committee of unsecured creditors from accessing certain documents withheld from production based on the attorney-client privilege. Despite the purpose underlying the committee’s creation, the court distinguished the role of the committee from that of a bankruptcy trustee and barred the production of privileged documents in the absence of a finding of insolvency. This ruling hampers the ability of a creditor’s committee to root out fraud and potentially recover money for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate.

In a significant ruling impacting commercial real estate lenders in Michigan, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that an absolute assignment of rents that had been fully perfected (by demanding payment from tenants to the lender and related recording) precludes a debtor from asserting that such rents can be used as cash collateral in bankruptcy. The reasoning is that these rents do not constitute property of the bankruptcy estate. As such, the debtor could not proceed with its Chapter 11 case.

Background

A New York District Court recently tackled the intersection between bankruptcy and pre-petition FDCPA claims and the application of judicial estoppel to undisclosed claims. In December 2013, Jeziorowski filed a complaint alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA). Jeziorowski v. Credit Prot. Assn., L.P., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66084 (W.D.N.Y. 2017). Shortly after filing suit, Jeziorowski filed bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 7.

As noted in a recent Distressing Matters post, the United States Supreme Court in In re Jevic Holding Corp. held that debtors cannot use structured dismissals to make payments to creditors in violation of ordinary bankruptcy distribution priority rules.

Bond indentures and loan agreements often include make-whole provisions to provide protection to lenders and investors in the event of debt repayment prior to maturity. Make-whole provisions work to compensate the investor/lender for any future interest lost when the issuer/borrower repays the note prior to a specific date.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently affirmed the dismissal of a mortgage loan borrower’s federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and related state law claims because the defendant mortgagee was not a “debt collector” as defined by the FDCPA.

In so ruling, the Court also rejected the borrower’s allegations that the monthly statements the mortgagee sent to the borrower after her bankruptcy discharge were impermissible implied assertions of a right to collect against her personally.