A defendant bank (“Bank”) in a fraudulent transfer suit “could not prove” its “good faith” defense for loan repayments it received after its “investigator discovered [the] fraudulent past” of the Ponzi scheme debtor’s principal but “failed to disclose that past to [the Bank’s account] manager,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on Feb. 8, 2017. Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2248, *28 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2017).

The Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, recently affirmed summary judgment in favor of a mortgagee that failed to meet the FHA requirement to either have a face-to-face meeting with the borrowers or to make “a reasonable effort” to arrange a face-to-face meeting before filing foreclosure, because doing so would have been a futile act after the borrowers’ mortgage loan debt was discharged in bankruptcy and they did not reaffirm the debt.

Companies that the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) believes may be subject to FDIC receivership under the Orderly Liquidation Authority contained in Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, and certain of their affiliates, are now subject to recordkeeping requirements related to their “qualified financial contracts”1 (QFCs).

Introduction

LBOs can get messy. Such was the case for the Tribune Company, which, in conjunction with its private equity investor, borrowed approximately $10.7 billion in 2007 to finance its buyout. Soon after the LBO was completed, Tribune experienced financial difficulties that made it unable to service its new debt, and, in December 2008, the company filed for chapter 11 protection.

(6th Cir. Feb. 23, 2017)

The Sixth Circuit affirms the bankruptcy court’s decision to confirm the debtor’s Chapter 13 plan, which included payment of overdue property taxes under Tennessee law with an interest rate of 12%. The state argued that the interest rate should be 18% due to the additional 6% interest permitted under the applicable state statute for a default penalty. The court holds that the 12% provided in the “nonbankruptcy law” is applicable, while the 6% penalty is not applicable. Opinion below.

Judge: Stranch

In January 2017, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its widely reported opinion in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC vs. Education Management Corp., in which the majority held that the “right ... to receive payment” set forth in Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (TIA) prohibits only nonconsensual amendments to an indenture’s core payment terms and does not protect the practical ability of bondholders to recover payment.

Background

On February 28, 2017, Judge Sontchi of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court issued an opinion (the “Opinion”) in the Money Center of America bankruptcy – Bankr. D. Del., Case 14-10603. The Opinion is available here. This Opinion decided two separate, but similar, motions to dismiss filed by 2 entities owned by federally recognized Indian Tribes and sovereign nations (the “Tribes”).

A recent case in the Southern District of New York, U.S. Bank, NA v. T.D. Bank, NA, applied the so-called Rule of Explicitness to the allocation of recoveries among creditors outside of a bankruptcy proceeding. In the bankruptcy context, this rule requires a clear and unambiguous intention to turn over post-petition interest to senior creditors at the expense of junior creditors. The court in this case found the requisite documentary clarity to pay post-petition interest ahead of the distribution of principal.

In a decision last month, DCF Capital, LLC v. US Shale Solutions, LLC (Sup. Ct. NY Co. Jan. 24, 2017), a New York State Supreme Court justice held that a noteholder that had properly accelerated indenture debt may sue to collect that debt notwithstanding the operation of a standard no-action clause. This holding, while appealing from a noteholder perspective, may not be compelled by Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act on which it rests and is contrary to some prior case law.

Background