On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve a “structured dismissal”—a dismissal with special conditions or that does something other than restoring the “prepetition financial status quo”—providing for distributions that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme absent the consent of affected creditors. Czyzewski v.Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), 2017 WL 1066259, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2017).
A potential threat to the Code’s priority scheme is the allowance of “structured dismissals,” which include a settlement as part of the dismissal of the chapter 11 case that would distribute estate assets in a manner that contravenes the Code’s priority rules.
Foreign financial institutions that trade dollar-denominated securities on the secondary market may not appreciate that they could be forced to defend an action arising from such a transaction in a U.S. court. That is what happened, however, to an Austrian bank that purchased a $10 million interest in a syndicated $1.5 billion term loan on the secondary market. In a recent decision, the bankruptcy court in Motors Liquidation Co. Avoidance Action Trust v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), Adv. Pro. No. 09-00504 (MG), 2017 WL 632126 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb.
In a recent opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit expanded the protections afforded to individual members of an official creditors’ committee against certain lawsuits. Specifically, in In re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, 841 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir.
In a recent decision by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, In re Hercules Offshore, Inc., et al., Judge Kevin J. Carey confirmed Hercules Offshore’s plan over objections by the Equity Committee—including an objection to allegedly impermissible plan releases and exculpations.
Background
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held that certain deposits and wire transfers into a bankrupt debtor’s personal, unrestricted checking account in the ordinary course of business were not “transfers” under § 101(54) of the Bankruptcy Code, affirming the district court’s and bankruptcy court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the bank in an adversary proceeding brought by the bankruptcy trustee.
“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).
A Chapter 7 debtor’s failure to comply with a bankruptcy court order to preserve a $2 million dollar-plus collection of fine wines has led to the imposition of sanctions of over $1 million, most of which could be charged against the debtor’s otherwise exempt property.
A defendant bank (“Bank”) in a fraudulent transfer suit “could not prove” its “good faith” defense for loan repayments it received after its “investigator discovered [the] fraudulent past” of the Ponzi scheme debtor’s principal but “failed to disclose that past to [the Bank’s account] manager,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on Feb. 8, 2017. Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2248, *28 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2017).
The Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, recently affirmed summary judgment in favor of a mortgagee that failed to meet the FHA requirement to either have a face-to-face meeting with the borrowers or to make “a reasonable effort” to arrange a face-to-face meeting before filing foreclosure, because doing so would have been a futile act after the borrowers’ mortgage loan debt was discharged in bankruptcy and they did not reaffirm the debt.