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The Alita matter serves as a good illustration that if you intend to seek leave under section 444GA(1)(b) you should act swiftly and with regard to the potential regulatory risk.

A hotly anticipated decision in the ongoing saga of the Babcock & Brown liquidation was handed down last week, resulting in another win for the liquidator (represented by Johnson Winter & Slattery) and further highlighting the challenges facing liquidators when they are thrust into a quasi-judicial function when assessing proofs of debt.

The recent Court of Appeal decision in the case of Doherty -v- Fannigan Holdings Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 1615 considers the issue of whether a failure to pay for shares, as provided for under an agreement between the parties is a debt on which a statutory demand can be based.

In the case of Delco Participation BV v Green Elite Limited [2018] the Court of Appeal considered the test for appointing liquidators to a company following an alleged loss of substratum.

The term “golden shares” is often referred to equity interests held by a specific party—commonly a lender or investor—that authorize such party to block or prevent a corporate entity from filing bankruptcy. Such shares are often negotiated by a party that wants to ensure that its consent is obtained before any bankruptcy is commenced. Without such consent, the party holding the golden shares can seek to dismiss to a corporate bankruptcy filing by based on a lack of corporate authority.

According to decision no. 17441, of 31 August 2016, of the First Division of the Supreme Civil Court, the liability of directors without management power cannot originate from a general failure to supervise – that would be identified in the facts as a strict liability – but must be attributed to the breach of the duty to act in an informed way, on the basis of both information to be released by executive directors and information that non-executive directors can gather on their own initiative.

The High Court yesterday held that a Chairperson of a shareholder scheme meeting may reject votes cast against a scheme of arrangement in circumstances where the shares were acquired through an artificial share-splitting exercise designed to frustrate the scheme. It is the first English case to consider this issue and while it arose in the context of a shareholder scheme, the impact is also significant for debt restructurings implemented by way of a creditor scheme of arrangement.

Background