目前对于陷入困境但仍具备重整价值及重整可行性的企业而言，破产重整是其实现风险出清和企业重生的重要方式。在破产重整中，投资人参与的主要方式包括股权投资、资产投资和债权投资等，其中股权投资为较为重要的投资方式（其基本流程如下图），本文将结合实践，从投资人视角，浅析破产重整中股权投资的机遇和风险防范，以期为投资人参与重整投资提供帮助。

图1：破产重整中股权投资基本流程图

一、重整投资的机遇

现阶段，重整投资作为“新一轮招商引资”处于重要机遇期。以上市公司重整为例，2023年7月底的数据显示其中超90%的产业投资人和财务投资人账面呈现浮盈[1]；2024年以来，截至11月，有44家上市公司被申请重整及预重整，较前一年同期增加超四成[2]。由此可见，破产重整蕴含着较多投资机会，其在目前政策环境、价值发掘、成本控制和业务整合等方面均展现出投资“机遇”。

It is not uncommon for contractors, in several industry sectors, to contract with a special purpose vehicle (SPV), whose day-to-day management is effectively controlled by a parent company, and the SPV has with little to no assets beyond cash flow provided by its parent. In this article we look at what a claimant could do outside of the traditional insolvency process in circumstances where the SPV goes into a form of external administration such as administration or liquidation and there are no assets available to the external administrators.

在当前的投融资环境下，国资背景的投资方常常承担着地方政府的返投任务，对被投企业的注册地点存在特定诉求，因此，若被投企业未注册在此类投资方期待的特定地区，则投资方可能会要求被投企业迁址以实现当地的招商引资。市场上已出现部分项目的投资方以此作为投资交割的前提条件。

优质企业无疑都是各地的“心头肉”，能为当地带来税收效益、工作岗位等。因此，企业的迁出之路可能面临迁出地政府“不放手”、迁出和迁入程序衔接不顺畅等一系列疑难问题，可能拉长迁址进度，甚至实质上无法最终完成迁址。

为协助企业顺利实现“迁址”目的，我们在相关交易中对企业迁址的命题进行重新思考和思路转换。事实上，除了直接变更注册地址，企业也可考虑通过股权重组进行股权结构的调整，以满足投资方对于变更融资主体及后续上市主体所在地的需求。但此等“重组式迁址”也并非一路坦途，如有不慎，同样可能面临法律和税务的障碍和风险，因此需要提前对这类重组交易进行审慎考量和规划。

一、直接迁址的障碍和难点

On 19 June 2024, the expected amendment to the Act on Transformations of Business Corporations and Cooperatives was published in the Collection of Laws. The amendment mainly transposes Directive (EU) 2019/2121 of the European Parliament and of the Council.

In addition to harmonising the process of cross-border transformations, unifying the regulation and reducing the administrative burden, the amendment also introduces a completely new form of transformation.

Below we summarise the key changes.

Bankruptcy law has always been an interesting area to practice and study in China. Having nominally a “socialist market economy” as per its Constitution, China allows its private sector to operate relatively freely within regularly re-defined boundaries but has a strong state-owned sector that comprises about half of the entire economy. Adding constant concerns about social stability in the country of 1.4 billion people, the rules for companies going into insolvency must be a careful balance between capitalist “freedom to fail” principles and governmental control over the economy.

在中国，破产法一直是一个有趣的实践和研究的领域。自从社会主义市场经济被写入我国宪法，我国就允许私营企业在定期不断重新界定的范围内相对自由地经营，同时约占整个经济一半的国有企业也展现出其雄厚的实力。在这个拥有14亿人口的国家，社会稳定问题一直备受关注，因此企业破产制度必须在资本主义“允许失败的自由”原则和政府对经济的管控之间保持谨慎的平衡。

中国的破产法从业人员一直热切期待新的并且能够对公司何时以及如何进行破产清算与重整产生影响的法律法规出台。中华人民共和国第十四届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第七次会议于2023年12月29日审议并通过了新修订的《中华人民共和国公司法》（简称“新公司法”），将自2024年7月1日起正式实施。本文将从破产实务的角度对新公司法进行解读。

Bankruptcy law has always been an interesting area to practice and study in China. Having nominally a “socialist market economy” as per its Constitution, China allows its private sector to operate relatively freely within regularly re-defined boundaries but has a strong state-owned sector that comprises about half of the entire economy. Adding constant concerns about social stability in the country of 1.4 billion people, the rules for companies going into insolvency must be a careful balance between capitalist “freedom to fail” principles and governmental control over the economy.

During summer 2023 the Swedish Government Official Report (SOU 2023:34) (the “Report”) was published proposing, inter alia, the removal of the requirements of a limited liability company to prepare a control balance sheet (Sw. Kontrollbalansräkning) and eventually enter into liquidation upon shortage of own capital. Instead, the suggestion was that the emphasis should be shifted more towards liquidity and solvency. The Report has now been through a referral process and by 15 December 2023 various referral bodies had submitted their responses to the Report.

A "Liquidation Preference" is a clause in investment and shareholders’ agreements that determines the order in which proceeds from a liquidity event (such as a trade sale or asset sale) are distributed among different shareholders. This clause often pertains primarily to preferred shareholders, such as venture capital investors.

The Federal Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht, BAG) had to decide in which case a social compensation plan endowment by the conciliation committee is economically unjustifiable for a company outside of insolvency. This shall be the case if the fulfilment of the social compensation plan obligation would lead to illiquidity, balance sheet over-indebtedness or an unacceptable reduction of the company's equity. If the endowment was economically unjustifiable, the discretion of the conciliation committee was exceeded and the social compensation plan therefore invalid.