A "Liquidation Preference" is a clause in investment and shareholders’ agreements that determines the order in which proceeds from a liquidity event (such as a trade sale or asset sale) are distributed among different shareholders. This clause often pertains primarily to preferred shareholders, such as venture capital investors.
As expected, the scope of directors' duties whilst a company is in financial difficulties has been the source of further consideration by the Court. The recent case of Hunt v Singh [2023] EWHC 1784 raised the question as to whether, following the Supreme Court decision in BTI 2014 LLC v Sequana SA, a director's duty to take into account the interests of creditors arises where the company is at the relevant time insolvent if a disputed liability comes to fruition.
The Federal Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht, BAG) had to decide in which case a social compensation plan endowment by the conciliation committee is economically unjustifiable for a company outside of insolvency. This shall be the case if the fulfilment of the social compensation plan obligation would lead to illiquidity, balance sheet over-indebtedness or an unacceptable reduction of the company's equity. If the endowment was economically unjustifiable, the discretion of the conciliation committee was exceeded and the social compensation plan therefore invalid.
Das Bundesarbeitsgericht (BAG) hatte darüber zu entscheiden, wann eine Sozialplandotierung durch die Einigungsstelle für ein Unternehmen außerhalb der Insolvenz wirtschaftlich unvertretbar ist. Dies sei der Fall, wenn die Erfüllung der Sozialplanverbindlichkeit zu einer Illiquidität, einer bilanziellen Überschuldung oder einer nicht mehr hinnehmbaren Schmälerung des Eigenkapitals der Gesellschaft führe. Liege danach eine wirtschaftliche Unvertretbarkeit vor, sei das Ermessen der Einigungsstelle überschritten und der beschlossene Sozialplan unwirksam.
Ben Gold, partner in RPC’s professional and financial risk team, explains how a recent Supreme Court case (BTI v Sequana) confirms company directors owe a duty to creditors if the company nears balance sheet or cash flow insolvency.
This ‘creditor duty’ is of increasing significance as insolvencies rise.
It is widely anticipated that the next twelve months could be a challenging period for many businesses in the UK and that there could be a significant rise in the number of companies in financial distress.
Where this is the case, the directors of those companies will need to be increasingly mindful of the duties they have to the company's creditors, as well as to its shareholders.