What does it mean to own something? When should the law acknowledge that somebody really owns something, even if they don't formally own it?

And when will courts recognize the economic reality that one person — say, a judgment debtor — in truth owns something, notwithstanding that person's painstaking efforts to keep formal legal title in the hands of others?

The law has long recognized doctrines to disregard the existence, or pierc the veil, of corporate entities to which a debtor has transferred assets.

Different recession, regulatory environment and litigation market leads to different exposures

Whilst there is a clear link between recessionary conditions and claims against financial institutions, financial services professionals and directors and officers, the lessons from the previous recessions in the early 1990s and 2008 onwards may only take us so far in predicting the outcomes this time, given the different economic base going in and the catalysts for this recession (which include the pandemic, the war in Ukraine and high inflation).

In what has been referred to as a “momentous decision for company law”, the Supreme Court recently considered whether, when a company is in the ‘insolvency zone’, its directors must have regard to the interests of its creditors in addition to, or instead of, its shareholders.

In a judgment rendered on 10 October 2021, the Dubai Court of First Instance had concluded that current and former directors and managers of Marka were personally liable towards creditors of the company merely on the basis that the assets of the company were not sufficient to pay at least 20% of its debts. The 20% threshold was set in onshore Federal Decree Law No. (9) of 2016 on Bankruptcy (the Bankruptcy Law) as it then was, and the Court determined that liability applied to current and former directors and managers without distinction where the threshold is not met.

In June 2021, we published an article (here)about the positive implications for insurers of our win in an unreported County Court case[1] in which the Deputy District Judge held that an insured’s insolvency did not have the effect of “pausing” the limitation clock from that date in relati

The challenges faced by the construction industry are continuing to grow and insiders wonder when the storm is going to hit. For some, like Probuild, it already has. Rising inflation and the increasing cost of debt, labour shortages, supply chain delays and escalating cost of freight and materials are putting the industry under enormous pressure. Simultaneously Governments have invested heavily in building and construction to maintain growth in the economy.

As 21st century disputes take on an increasingly cross-border character, so, too have parties resorted to a powerful tool provided to non-U.S. litigants under American law -- petitions to take discovery pursuant to Title 28 of the U.S. Code, Section 1782.

While many have focused on the question of whether private international arbitrations can support Section 1782 petitions, case law has evolved on another question: Can Section 1782 be used by litigants seeking to identify property to satisfy judgments rendered in non-U.S. proceedings?

What role might dispute funding play in a complex cross-border dispute involving multiple jurisdictions in Latin America?

A recent Fifth Circuit decision released on December 7 sends a clear message to those seeking to challenge a trustee’s litigation funding agreement: you’d better be on solid ground when it comes to “standing.”

In the five-page opinion authored by Judge Jacques L. Weiner, Jr., the court found that the appellant-debtor in In re Dean lacked standing to challenge a funding agreement approved by a Texas Bankruptcy Court. The Fifth Circuit found that the debtor was not “directly, adversely, and financially impacted” by the funding agreement or the bankruptcy court’s order.

In the case of Anchorage Capital Master Offshore Ltd v Sparkes (No 3); Bank of Communications Co Ltd v Sparkes (No 2) [2021] NSWSC 1025 (Anchorage v Sparkes), the Supreme Court of NSW considered the obligations of company officers to sophisticated commercial lending entities, and whether company officers could be personally liable for making misleading statements.

Significance