In the current market, investors are increasingly considering their options in relation to the stressed and distressed credits in their portfolios. Whilst mindful of stakeholder relationships, secured lenders may, in some circumstances, wish to consider the "nuclear option": enforcing their share pledge over a holding company of the operating group (ideally, such pledge being over a single company which directly or indirectly holds the entire business - a "single point of enforcement").

Senior secured creditors, being the anchor creditor in the capital stack, will always be focused on ensuring their priority claim is as robust as possible, with clearly delineated capacity for 'super priority' debt. However, today's documentary flexibilities, coupled with local legal restrictions, can mean senior secured creditors are not as 'senior secured' as they think. Here are some points to think about.

Super Senior Debt

Bankruptcy law has always been an interesting area to practice and study in China. Having nominally a “socialist market economy” as per its Constitution, China allows its private sector to operate relatively freely within regularly re-defined boundaries but has a strong state-owned sector that comprises about half of the entire economy. Adding constant concerns about social stability in the country of 1.4 billion people, the rules for companies going into insolvency must be a careful balance between capitalist “freedom to fail” principles and governmental control over the economy.

在中国，破产法一直是一个有趣的实践和研究的领域。自从社会主义市场经济被写入我国宪法，我国就允许私营企业在定期不断重新界定的范围内相对自由地经营，同时约占整个经济一半的国有企业也展现出其雄厚的实力。在这个拥有14亿人口的国家，社会稳定问题一直备受关注，因此企业破产制度必须在资本主义“允许失败的自由”原则和政府对经济的管控之间保持谨慎的平衡。

中国的破产法从业人员一直热切期待新的并且能够对公司何时以及如何进行破产清算与重整产生影响的法律法规出台。中华人民共和国第十四届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第七次会议于2023年12月29日审议并通过了新修订的《中华人民共和国公司法》（简称“新公司法”），将自2024年7月1日起正式实施。本文将从破产实务的角度对新公司法进行解读。

Bankruptcy law has always been an interesting area to practice and study in China. Having nominally a “socialist market economy” as per its Constitution, China allows its private sector to operate relatively freely within regularly re-defined boundaries but has a strong state-owned sector that comprises about half of the entire economy. Adding constant concerns about social stability in the country of 1.4 billion people, the rules for companies going into insolvency must be a careful balance between capitalist “freedom to fail” principles and governmental control over the economy.

During summer 2023 the Swedish Government Official Report (SOU 2023:34) (the “Report”) was published proposing, inter alia, the removal of the requirements of a limited liability company to prepare a control balance sheet (Sw. Kontrollbalansräkning) and eventually enter into liquidation upon shortage of own capital. Instead, the suggestion was that the emphasis should be shifted more towards liquidity and solvency. The Report has now been through a referral process and by 15 December 2023 various referral bodies had submitted their responses to the Report.

On 1st November 2023, the new Luxembourg law of 7 August 2023 on the continuation of businesses and modernisation of insolvency law (the "Law") enters into force.

This long-awaited reform implements Directive 2019/1023 to introduce a modern restructuring regime, with out-of-court and court supervised mechanisms to protect companies in distress. The Law is expected to provide more flexible and effective measures for businesses under financial stress and their creditors, making Luxembourg an attractive jurisdiction for restructurings.

A "Liquidation Preference" is a clause in investment and shareholders’ agreements that determines the order in which proceeds from a liquidity event (such as a trade sale or asset sale) are distributed among different shareholders. This clause often pertains primarily to preferred shareholders, such as venture capital investors.

Volatile credit markets and guarded banks have made securing term loan C (TLC) debt attractive for borrowers who heavily rely on letters of credit to trade but either have low credit ratings or otherwise have difficulty accessing large enough revolving facilities to support the high amount of letters of credit needed.

The Federal Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht, BAG) had to decide in which case a social compensation plan endowment by the conciliation committee is economically unjustifiable for a company outside of insolvency. This shall be the case if the fulfilment of the social compensation plan obligation would lead to illiquidity, balance sheet over-indebtedness or an unacceptable reduction of the company's equity. If the endowment was economically unjustifiable, the discretion of the conciliation committee was exceeded and the social compensation plan therefore invalid.